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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHARLES R. BREYER, JUDGE

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ONO. C 13-3663 CRB

CITY OF RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA,
Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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(Appearances continued, next page)

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(Appearances continued, next page)

APPEARANCES, CONTINUED: For Amicus Curiae Applicants California Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, California Mortgage Bankers Association, and California Credit Union League: DLA PIPER LLP 555 Mission Street Suite 2400 San Francisco, California 94105 BY: PAUL J. HALL, ESQ. ISABELLE ORD, ESQ. BELLE BALL, CSR, CRR, RDR Reported By: Official Reporter, U.S. District Court

1 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 10:07 A.M. 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 THE CLERK: Calling Case C-13-3663, Wells Fargo 4 versus City of Richmond, California. Appearances, counsel? 5 Pleas approach the podium and make your appearances, 6 counsel. 7 MR. PRIVAT: Good morning, Your Honor. Carlos Privat with the City of Richmond. 8 9 MR. ERTMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. John Ertman for the Plaintiff Trusts. 10 MR. KRONLAND: Good morning, Your Honor. Scott 11 Kronland for the City of Richmond and Mortgage Resolution 12 13 Partners. MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Good morning, Your Honor. 14 15 Doug Hallward-Driemeier with Plaintiff Trusts. MR. FALIK: Good morning, Your Honor. Bill Falik for 16 17 Mortgage Resolution Partners. 18 MR. TSAI: Good morning, Your Honor. Rocky Tsai for 19 the Plaintiff Trusts. MR. BERZON: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen 2.0 Berzon for all Defendants. 21 22 THE COURT: Good morning. 23 MR. JACOB: Good morning, Your Honor. Tom Jacob for 24 Wells Fargo Bank. 25 MR. QIAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Kent Qian for

Defendants National Housing Law Project, Bay Area Legal Aid, 1 2 California Reinvestment Coalition and Law Foundation of 3 Silicon Valley and Housing and Economic Rights Advocates. 4 MR. BROWN: Good morning, Your Honor. Eric Brown for 5 all Defendants. 6 MS. LEYTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Stacey Leyton 7 for all Defendants. MS. BRODY: Good morning, Your Honor. Sara Brody on 8 9 behalf of the Chamber of Commerce and SIFMA. MR. HALL: Good morning, Your Honor. Paul Hall for 10 the proposed Amicus Curiae applicants, California Bankers 11 Association, American Bankers Association, California Mortgage 12 13 Bankers Association, and California Credit Union League. THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, everybody. 14 15 I have read the papers that have been submitted. particular, a -- a submission came from the Defendants 16 17 entitled "Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum," dated today --18 yesterday, pardon me, yesterday -- giving me an update of what 19 happened at the Council meeting on -- on September 10th. 2.0 Okay. 21 So, it appears -- this is a motion for preliminary

So, it appears -- this is a motion for preliminary injunction. Also a motion in connection with amicus wanting permission to file briefs. And I -- I think I would like to address that after I -- the amicus issue after I address the other issue, because of what my thinking is on the other

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issue, which is, there seems to be a substantial question as to whether or not this motion is ripe for determination.

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Even in light of -- or maybe in particular in light of the Council meeting on September 10th, it appears that there are a series of steps that are contemplated by the Council to take place before the implementation of a program which would include -- or not -- eminent domain. And if it did, what that would look like, and whether it would be the City Council doing so or something called a Joint Powers Authority.

And therefore, it appears to me that there are a number of steps that can or cannot take place. And if they do take place, then the question is -- and implement a -- implement the program or attempt to implement the program, which would include eminent domain, then that's the time that the Court ought to take a look at it, I think.

There is no question in the Court's mind that there are serious questions raised here. And, so, it's not the intention of the Court by saying that I don't think the matter is ripe for determination, to make any finding as to whether or not an injunction would be issued, whether there are — though it seems at first blush to be serious issues, the Court would have to have a hearing on that, in order to determine the propriety of granting an injunction.

I'm not offering an opinion as to whether or not if the program went through as contemplated, I would or would not

issue an injunction because I think when you say something is not ripe for determination, you don't turn around and determine it.

Okay. So -- isn't that right? I mean, isn't this a -- isn't this, as we say in the trade, a no-brainer? I mean, really? I mean -- what happens if the -- if the Council never passes this thing? What am I supposed to do?

MR. ERTMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Spend months of -- of difficult constitutional searching to try to get the right answer? I don't think so.

So, go ahead. Tell me about it.

MR. ERTMAN: Yes.

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THE COURT: Anybody who opposes -- anybody who says it's ripe for determination, stand up now, and I'll hear you.

MR. ERTMAN: Yes, Your Honor. John Ertman from Ropes & Gray for the Plaintiff Trusts.

Your Honor, the matter is more than ripe. There's more information that Your Honor doesn't have, because Tuesday night was a significant development in this case. And, the Defendant submission doesn't fully explain what happened at the City Council at all, at the City Council meeting.

At the session last Tuesday night, the Council addressed eminent domain at length. And, and a motion was presented to the City Council to rescind the loan offers in this case and

1 abandon the loan seizure program with MRP. 2 Okay, this motion was defeated, five to two. 3 Now, the minutes of that hearing aren't available yet, but 4 I am prepared to hand up to the Court a summary of what was 5 voted on at the hearing. I can hand up to the Court two 6 copies of that. 7 (Document handed up to the Court) THE COURT: Has opposing counsel received a copy of 8 9 this? 10 MR. ERTMAN: Yes. MR. KRONLAND: Well, not yet. 11 (Counsel distributes a copy of document to Defense Table) 12 13 THE COURT: Not yet. Okay, well, here it is. This will be very familiar to 14 MR. ERTMAN: Yeah. 15 them, Your Honor. Okay. What was voted on, Agenda Item 1, okay, where the 16 17 proposal was to direct the city manager to withdraw any offers made to trustees and servicers of mortgage loans. 18 I won't repeat the whole thing for the record, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Well, I think we should make this part of 2.0 the record. 2.1 22 MR. ERTMAN: Okay, then I'll continue on. 23 THE COURT: No, you don't have to continue on, just 24 mark it as an exhibit and it will be part of the record. 25 MR. ERTMAN: Okay.

1 THE COURT: You can say whatever you want to say, but 2 it should be part -- anything that I look at I think should be 3 part of the record. 4 (List of Agenda Items made a part of the Record) 5 MR. ERTMAN: Right. Okay. This proposal to end the 6 eminent domain program was voted down, five to two. 7 Defendants don't even mention this five-to-two vote in their submission to the Court from yesterday. 8 9 And it was clear at the hearing, Your Honor, that there is a passion in Richmond for carrying out this program. 10 11 could see that all --THE COURT: Sorry, there's a what? 12 13 MR. ERTMAN: There is a passion in Richmond --THE COURT: Passion. 14 15 This is no ordinary government program. MR. ERTMAN: 16 There is a passion for --17 THE COURT: Didn't look like an ordinary government 18 program to me. 19 MR. ERTMAN: No. 2.0 THE COURT: And I'm sure there's passion. I'm sure 2.1 that people care a great deal about their houses, as they 22 should. And their -- and their -- their basic security. 23 they should. 24 But, passion. 25 MR. ERTMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Basic constitutional liberties.

Constitutional rights. All of that is significant and important.

The question is, if you were -- if you were to say to me,

"Look, the program is, as constituted, and as -- as voted on

by the -- by the Council, is -- is constitutionally infirm,

and therefore an injunction is necessary to stop it in its

present form because in its present form, it is being

implemented, or there's an immediate threat to its

implementation," I would say, "Okay, I guess it's ripe for

determination."

MR. ERTMAN: Right.

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THE COURT: And that's not -- when I read what -unless I read something incorrectly, it said -- and I think I
should read this -- it said that the local -- that the Council
voted to direct the staff to work up a set -- to (As read):

"...to work to set up a Joint Powers Authority
together with other interested municipalities, as the
next step forward in the development of this program;
to confirm that no loans will be acquired by the City
through eminent domain before coming back to a full
City Council for a vote; and to continue working with
MRP to resolve any remaining legal issues."

There are quite a few remaining legal issues, I would suggest.

1 But in any event, isn't -- isn't the present status of 2 this matter going to require further action on the part of the 3 City Council? That is my question. 4 MR. ERTMAN: Yeah. Not -- not material action, 5 Your Honor. They have a program, they have a plan --6 THE COURT: Do they have a supermajority who voted in 7 favor of this? MR. ERTMAN: Yes. Five -- five to two, six -- five 8 9 to two on Tuesday night. But, it originated back in April. In April, the City Council voted six-nothing to proceed with 10 MRP, and MRP's loan seizure program. 11 At the time, the City Council was presented with the 12 purported public use of the MRP program. And that's submitted 13 in the Ertman Reply Declaration, Exhibit 8. I could read that 14 15 to you. 16 So, there's no dispute here over what the proposed --17 THE COURT: No, I'm not arguing, or I'm not asking you questions about the history of this matter --18 19 MR. ERTMAN: Right. THE COURT: -- at this point. What I'm -- what I'm 2.0 2.1 looking at is: Where do we go from here? What is exactly the 22 next step? 23 MR. ERTMAN: Right. 24 THE COURT: If you are saying to me the next step 25 will be the institution of eminent domain, then that's, number

1 one, not my understanding. 2 But, if my understanding is in error, I should take a look 3 at it. Because if that's the next step, then the Court should 4 -- should review the situation, and perhaps, if appropriate, 5 intervene by way of a -- by way of an injunction. 6 Are you saying to me that's actually the next step? 7 MR. ERTMAN: Yes. That is what I'm saying. exactly the next step. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. They have a preexisting plan. They have 10 MR. ERTMAN: -- they have a timeline that they have been following since 11 they voted six-nothing back in April for this program. 12 13 The timeline is Ertman Reply Declaration H, but I would hand up a copy for the Court. 14 15 THE COURT: Is this the Gantt chart? MR. ERTMAN: Yes. Yes, it is, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. And now, here I am, I'm looking at 17 this thing. And just tell me when the eminent domain --18 19 MR. ERTMAN: Yes. 2.0 THE COURT: Looking at the chart, tell me, when does 2.1 eminent domain begin? The eminent domain proceeding. MR. ERTMAN: Right. So, the next step, now that 22 they've made loan offers on 624 loans and those offers have 23 24 all been rejected, the next step, if you look down to the

chart, it says -- you know, and this was generated a few days

after -- or it was provided to Richmond a few days after the six-nothing vote in April. Okay.

"JPA approves RON."

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That's the resolution on necessity. And then immediately afterwards:

"JPA files motion."

And if you look on that chart, these are the next steps,
Your Honor. They pass a resolution of necessity, and the next
day, they file a state eminent domain action where they seek
the quick take. To irreversibly take possession of these
loans, extinguish them, and flip them.

This is the whole strategy here. And, since April --

THE COURT: Well, then, explain to me, in the opposition, the opponents say the following thing. They say (As read):

"The City Council has not adopted a resolution of necessity to authorize the use of eminent domain authority, or even held a public hearing on whether to adopt a proposed resolution of necessity, or even given notice of such a public hearing."

Now, my question to you is: Is that true?

MR. ERTMAN: That is true. But, given their commitment to going ahead with the program, that -- that issuance of the resolution of necessity is just, at this point, a ministerial act.

THE COURT: Oh. Now, let's talk about ministerial acts. I'm always interested in them. Because, the only ministerial act of which I'm absolutely aware of is the one after the Senate of the United States confirms a nominee to be a federal judge, and the President hasn't made the appointment.

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It was held in *Marbury versus Madison* that that act of the President appointing a federal judge is a ministerial act.

That's actually the only one that I'm really -- that is up in my mind right now.

Now, putting that aside, if you were to say to me that this is just like nominating -- appointing a federal judge, this is -- this is just the same thing, which means that any -- you know, the clerk can issue the notice, and if a clerk didn't issue the notice, a -- a writ of mandamus would come in or whatever it is, requiring the clerk to do so, that there's nothing left other than that, I'll listen.

On the other hand, if what you are saying to me is it's a foregone conclusion in light of the history of what this program -- of the -- of the -- of this -- you know, of the history of this program, of the discussion and the other acts of the board and so forth and so on, that it will go through, to that I would say, Okay, you might be absolutely right. But it's not a ministerial act. It still is subject to all sorts of things. Including, including, the -- the voice of the --

the public and the affected people lobbying members of the Council in an effort to persuade them to their particular point of view.

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That's called the democratic process. And I wouldn't at all take the position that the democratic process is really just a ministerial act.

MR. ERTMAN: No, Your Honor. We're not seeking to enjoin meetings of the Richmond City Council -- deliberations of the Richmond City Council. It's -- at this point, they've already voted on this twice. They voted six-nothing to go ahead in April. They voted five-two last Tuesday night, to keep going, notwithstanding all of the many negative concerns about this program that were raised in the seven-hour hearing on Tuesday night. So, there's now been two votes over this.

Okay. At this point, okay, what they're arguing to this

Court is that at the resolution of necessity, there is some

hypothetical possibility the City Council may change their

mind. And, given the commitment and the history of the

Council and all the deliberations been done, and the two votes

have been taken, okay, that is just pure speculation at this

point.

THE COURT: How many members are there of the Council?

MR. ERTMAN: There are seven.

THE COURT: Okay. And so, a supermajority is

1	necessary. Is that correct?		
2	MR. ERTMAN: Yes.		
3	THE COURT: And that would be five.		
4	MR. ERTMAN: Yes.		
5	THE COURT: Is it five out of seven present? Or five		
6	simply is it is it two-thirds-present vote? That's the		
7	old sort of test for filibuster.		
8	Is it the is it the is it they need five votes to		
9	pass it, even if only six people show up? Or, if six people		
10	show up, they only need four votes to pass it? Or, you don't		
11	know.		
12	MR. ERTMAN: That, I don't know the answer to. I've		
13	always assumed it was five.		
14	THE COURT: Well, somebody thinks they know the		
15	answer.		
16	Yes.		
17	MR. PRIVAT: Good morning, Your Honor. We would need		
18	five votes to pass that.		
19	THE COURT: Okay. So, five votes to pass it. Okay.		
20	(Reporter interruption)		
21	THE COURT: Sorry. And it's your yeah, you have		
22	to speak slowly. You have to speak slowly.		
23	MR. ERTMAN: (Nods head)		
24	THE COURT: Go ahead. I interrupted you once again,		
25	so go ahead.		

MR. ERTMAN: Sure.

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So, Your Honor, given the actual facts of what is happening here, you know, if they're right that ripeness doesn't occur until this resolution of necessity is issued, it would mean that for any unlawful government program, the government could always try to avoid judicial review by claiming they might change their mind at some point and reverse course at some point. But here --

THE COURT: Isn't that a good idea, by the way, just as matter of public policy? Isn't it a good idea to have legislative bodies act lawfully in -- in -- you know, that is, act with a real sensitivity towards constitutional issues?

And if they come to their -- to this conclusion, even though their 'druthers might be to do X, Y or Z, they are finally persuaded that they shouldn't do X, Y or Z, and they don't have some court ordering them not to do X, Y and Z, isn't that a better way of resolving -- isn't that a better way of governance? Isn't that a better way, under our constitutional system?

If you could be successful persuading the Council not to go forward on this, even at the last minute, isn't that a better way than having the Court jump in, into basically a somewhat-novel -- and I'm not -- I'm not belittling the seriousness of your motion.

MR. ERTMAN: Right.

THE COURT: I'm just saying that it's an area that I haven't seen before in this context. And I think -- I would certainly think that it's just better for a court not to rule, unless a court should rule. And I don't see why a court should rule, unless it appears that this eminent domain process is essentially imminent.

I will tell you, I will tell you, the Court can act very, very quickly in this matter, within 24 hours, there's no question in my mind, were I to grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

And I -- you know, all you would have to do if it became imminent is simply notify the Court of that fact. You might have to file a notice of related case, if that happens. I would certainly accept the case. And I would -- I would address it immediately.

MR. ERTMAN: Yes, so --

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THE COURT: So, I don't -- yeah, I appreciate, when people's houses are on the line, I appreciate the fact that -- that there is a need for expeditious, immediate response by a court. You know, it's not the sort of thing that goes to court and just sort of sits there.

I don't have a problem with your argument about the immediacy or necessity of relief. However, that's once it becomes clear that immediate relief is necessary.

And that's one of the -- the criteria for a -- for a

preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, you have to show some immediacy which would justify what is an extraordinary -- relief of an extraordinary nature.

MR. ERTMAN: Right. I think Your Honor identified the concern here, because --

(Reporter interruption)

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MR. ERTMAN: If they're right that this doesn't become ripe until they issue a resolution on necessity -- and again, Your Honor, our position is that that's just a one-page piece of paper that just tells what the loans are to be taken, we already know that; tells the public purpose, we already know what that is. They already approved that six-nothing back in April, and they've repeated that public purposes multiple times. So, there's no mystery as to what the public purpose is. There's nothing new coming from this resolution on necessity.

But, the critical issue is that the plan all along, you can see from the timeline, is they issue the resolution on necessity at the end of a council hearing. The next day, they file in state court. And they've made clear in their papers, they don't want to be here in Federal Court.

Okay, and if they're right --

THE COURT: They -- they like it here.

MR. ERTMAN: Not -- not -- not what they say, right?

That if -- if they're right that this doesn't become ripe

until the resolution on necessity issues, the way their plan works is we likely could never be in a federal district court to protect our constitutional rights. Because then, if this case gets dismissed, they follow their plan, they issue the resolution on necessity. The next day, they're in state court. We come back here, then they argue younger abstention. Right? They say that we're the second-filed case, we don't belong here.

And that can't be the right outcome, Your Honor, because we are entitled to be in federal district court on an eminent-domain-taking case to seek resolution of our constitutional --

THE COURT: Let me ask your worthy opponents there to respond to that particular argument, and only that particular argument.

(Reporter interruption)

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THE COURT: You have to identify yourself, so there's at least an outside chance that --

MR. KRONLAND: Good morning, Your Honor. Scott Kronland on behalf of the Defendants.

As I understand the argument, it's that if a resolution of necessity were adopted, after noticed public hearing, a supermajority vote, the City could then file a lawsuit promptly in state court, and the Defendants would then be able to raise all of their arguments in the state court action, and

they would be able to come here and seek an injunction in federal court.

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But at that point, the Court might decide to abstain because the state court was an adequate forum. And, therefore, the Court might decide to abstain.

And then, having had this Court determine that the state court was an adequate forum, and therefore, that the Court should abstain, the Defendants would then be suffering irrepairable harm because, like most Defendants, they have to raise their constitutional defenses in a state court action.

It -- it doesn't make a lot of sense. People raise defenses in state court actions all the time. And if the Court decided to abstain, it would be making the determination that the action was appropriately heard in state court. And if the Court decided not to abstain, it would be hearing the action in federal court.

But, there's no rush. It's not as if someone files a lawsuit in state court, and the next day the state court holds a trial and issues a judgment. Even the quick-take procedure that they have referred to in their papers is a motion on sixty days' notice. There would be plenty of time for this Court to decide what to do.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. One option the Court may have -- though I'm not sure I do, and that's why I'm asking the question -- would be to -- not to dismiss it,

but simply to -- to stay it, or to otherwise continue it. Not issue any type of extraordinary relief at this point. And some -- and either if the program is implemented or attempted to be implemented, or whatever that piece of paper is, the necessity and so forth, so arguably it's ripe, I mean, even more arguably than it is today, but truly ripe for determination, then this Court could examine the issues.

So my question to you is: Would that be a satisfactory

So my question to you is: Would that be a satisfactory resolution of the problem today?

MR. KRONLAND: No, Your Honor. Let me give you several reasons. I mean, first of all, it's not a legal option. There's a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that's been made.

Your Honor is right that it's a no-brainer. It's like challenging the immigration reform legislation before Congress adopted it. The Supreme Court's been very clear that the duty of the Court is to announce it lacks jurisdiction, dismiss the case.

But as a practical matter, I never want to tell the Federal Court it couldn't do something. Having the case out there is --

THE COURT: My wife doesn't seem to have that problem.

(Laughter)

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MR. KRONLAND: Well, I've had -- bad experiences.

1 THE COURT: You haven't met my wife. Okay. 2 MR. KRONLAND: As a practical matter, having the case 3 out there is an interference with the political process. 4 Other cities are reluctant to join in a --5 THE COURT: Well, I think that as a matter of 6 jurisprudence, I think you're right. I mean, I don't think I 7 have that option. I think that I'd either -- would proceed with this on their -- their argument. 8 9 I don't think -- the question of -- an issue has to be ripe for determination for standing purposes, as I understand 10 it. And, if it's not ripe for determination, there is no 11 standing, it's not a case in controversy in front of me, and I 12 13 can't just say, "Oh, I think I'll hold onto this until it becomes a case or controversy, because it's so interesting." 14 15 I can't do that, in my view. I mean, I think that --16 MR. ERTMAN: You're --17 MR. KRONLAND: That's correct, Your Honor. 18 MR. ERTMAN: I don't think he's right, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay, all right. Wait a minute. Let me 2.0 just -- is that --2.1 MR. KRONLAND: That's the law, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Have I got your argument correct? 23 MR. KRONLAND: That is correct. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Yes, sir. 25 MR. ERTMAN: We're happy to make a supplemental

1 submission on this. You -- there is precedent. You could 2 hold the case in abeyance. Okay. Our position here is that it's a factual matter. 3 4 Their next step is to do the resolution on necessity, 5 and start seizing loans. It's going to happen imminently. 6 And --7 THE COURT: When do you actually think it's going to 8 happen? 9 MR. ERTMAN: Well, from -- if you watched the hearing on Tuesday night, you can see -- we'll submit it's any day, 10 very soon. Because that is the next step. They've made the 11 offers. The offers have been rejected. 12 13 THE COURT: Well, but they're talking about creating a joint powers -- what is it called? I mean, that's not a --14 15 that's not a five-minute turnaround, is it? I mean --That's a red herring, Your Honor. 16 MR. ERTMAN: They've been talking about that for months. It's just to try 17 to bring in other cities, into this. 18 It doesn't change the fact that they've committed to go 19 2.0 forward with this program. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. ERTMAN: So, that's not new news. And, yes, 23 Your Honor. So, if we have the ability to do a brief 24 supplemental submission, because there is precedent to hold

this in abeyance, if that's what the Court was so inclined to

do. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. Let's end the suspense. I don't 3 believe it's ripe for determination, for the reasons that I've 4 stated. 5 While it raises serious issues, and I'm sympathetic to the 6 fact that it is raising certain issues, I -- I do not believe 7 it's ripe at this point. And the question then becomes: Do I dismiss it? Or do I somehow stay it? 8 9 I believe Defense Counsel's correct that -- that I must dismiss it. 10 11 On the other hand, I'll give you the opportunity -- I'll give both sides the opportunity to submit a supplemental 12 13 statement. I don't need a -- you know, a magnum opus on this subject. I would prefer -- I'll let you -- you write what you 14 15 want to write. But I would like it by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow. And, I will rule on Monday. 16 17 MR. KRONLAND: Your Honor, I -- I'm not -- I understand Your Honor's --18 THE COURT: Both sides, both sides can do it. 19 MR. KRONLAND: -- supplemental briefing, but I would 2.0 just direct the Court to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2.1 22 12(h). 23 THE COURT: Well, your magnum opus will be very 24 short.

MR. KRONLAND: Per the Supreme Court's decision in --

1 in Steel Co where the --2 THE COURT: All I want you to do is to do it. Okay? 3 MR. KRONLAND: Okay. 4 THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. 5 MR. ERTMAN: And alternatively, Your Honor, if 6 Your Honor --7 THE COURT: You have an alternative. MR. ERTMAN: Yes. If Your Honor is inclined to grant 8 9 a motion to dismiss, we would like leave to amend the complaint to address all the new facts about ripeness that 10 11 have come out. THE COURT: Well, that's another -- that's another 12 13 consideration. I don't know. You can put that in your -then now, you have something to right about. You can put that 14 15 in that brief that I'm going to get tomorrow. My guess is that you have to make a motion and so forth to amend. 16 17 But, I don't know where we are at this point. These are ideas that I haven't considered. If you -- if you -- you can 18 submit what you want to submit by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I'll 19 rule on Monday on whatever you've submitted. Okay? 2.0 2.1 But, with the understanding that I do not -- that I so 22 find that it's not ripe for determination -- that I do find 23 that it's not ripe for determination. Because, I don't want 24 to mislead anybody into believing that they should make some

other argument about why it's ripe. I don't believe it's

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ripe. And I've tried to say why I think it is not ripe.
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 2
         But, then the question is: What remedy does -- what
 3
    procedure, what appropriate procedure does the Court follow.
    Okay?
 4
 5
         All right. Thank you very much. Thank you for coming in.
 6
              MR. KRONLAND: Thank you.
 7
         (Applause)
8
         (Conclusion of Proceedings)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, BELLE BALL, Official Reporter for the United States Court, Northern District of California, hereby certify that the

foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Belle Ball Belle Ball

Thursday, September 12, 2013
Belle Ball, CSR 8785, CRR, RDR

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

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CITY OF RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA, a municipality, and MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS LLC.

Defendants.

No. C 13-03663 CRB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND **DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR** A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (dkt. 8) and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (dkt. 38). For the reasons stated in open court at the hearing held on September 12, 2013, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for adjudication.¹

The Court further concludes that it must dismiss the case rather than hold it in abeyance. Ripeness of these claims does not rest on contingent future events certain to occur, but rather on future events that may never occur. In contrast to the facts in the cases Plaintiffs cite,² such as

¹ See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) ("A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.") (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)); Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The mere possibility that [an official] may act in an arguably unconstitutional manner . . . is insufficient to establish the real and substantial controversy required to render a case justiciable under Article III.") (internal quotation omitted).

See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (case not fit for review and "should be held in abeyance pending the new rule that the government has promised will be issued soon"); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (case held in

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proposed agency rules that will become final in some form, or pending suits in other jurisdictions
that will reach some disposition, the issues here may never reach a resolution. Plaintiffs are not, for
example, challenging a proposal of the City Council that may or may not raise constitutional
concerns depending on the contours of the final version—put simply, there may never be a "final
version." Because there is no point at which it will be determined that Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe
and will never become ripe, the matter could linger in abeyance for an indefinite period of time.
Under these circumstances, a stay is not appropriate.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and DISMISSES this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice.³

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2013

CHARLES R. BREYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

abeyance until agency's final action on proposed rule); <u>Pardee v. Consumer Portfolio Servs., Inc.</u>, 344 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (D.R.I. 2004) (case not ripe and proceedings stayed until related cases in other jurisdictions resolved).

³ Plaintiffs argue that they should be granted leave to amend their complaint to address the ripeness deficiency. The Court that finds that no amendment at this point would cure the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Nor does the Court find it appropriate to impose conditions on dismissal, particularly given that the Court's lack of jurisdiction is the very reason for dismissal.