

Report to the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark Regarding Monsignor Joseph Reilly

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In April 2024, Seton Hall University (“Seton Hall,” or the “University”) announced that it had selected Monsignor Joseph Reilly as the University’s twenty-second President. Several months after he took office, media reports emerged that Monsignor Reilly had purportedly been implicated in a University investigation conducted by Latham & Watkins LLP (“Latham”) into allegations of sexual misconduct by Theodore McCarrick, the former Archbishop of Newark. The Latham investigation concluded with a report issued in September 2019 (the “Latham Report”).

These media reports published two confidential letters addressed to Monsignor Reilly from a University Special Task Force convened in the fall of 2019 to address the findings of the Latham Report. The publication of these letters raised questions about whether Monsignor Reilly had appropriately handled allegations of sexual misconduct during his tenure as a leader of Immaculate Conception Seminary (“ICS”) at Seton Hall, and whether the University had adequately addressed the matter before naming him President. To be clear, Monsignor Reilly has never been personally accused of sexual misconduct. Rather, Ropes & Gray LLP’s Review (defined below) focuses on his handling of allegations made by and against others during his tenure as a seminary leader and the vetting process that preceded his appointment as President.

Against this backdrop, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark (“RCAN”) engaged Ropes & Gray to conduct a third-party review (“Review”) to assess what prior Seton Hall investigations revealed about (i) Monsignor Reilly’s knowledge of and response to sexual misconduct allegations made against other individuals, (ii) whether relevant information was communicated to appropriate personnel at RCAN and Seton Hall, and (iii) how and to whom any information was conveyed.

The Latham Report

This Report (“Report”) first considers the extent to which the Latham Report made any findings whatsoever about Monsignor Reilly. In short, it made none. The Latham Report contains no findings or allegations that Monsignor Reilly engaged in any misconduct, or that he witnessed or received reports of any sexual misconduct by McCarrick (or any other individuals) at any time, including while he served as McCarrick’s priest secretary from 1994-1995. Indeed, the Latham Report’s only references to Monsignor Reilly are passing ones, noting his efforts to improve communication and information-sharing among RCAN, ICS, and Seton Hall.

Seminary Incidents and the Special Task Force Process

While the Latham investigation was initially prompted by McCarrick’s alleged sexual misconduct, it expanded over time to include alleged misconduct by other clergy, the University’s institutional response to such allegations, and Title IX compliance at ICS and the College Seminary at St. Andrew’s Hall (“SAH”). Following the investigation, the University’s Board of Regents adopted a Responsive Action Plan (“RAP”) and established a Special Task Force to afford individuals about whom the RAP had made personnel recommendations an opportunity to be heard. As relevant to Monsignor Reilly, the Special Task Force addressed two incidents involving alleged misconduct, a 2012 ICS incident and a 2014 SAH matter.

The 2012 ICS Incident

In September 2012, shortly after Monsignor Reilly began serving as Rector/Dean of ICS (a combined leadership role), he was notified that a seminarian (“Seminarian 1”) alleged sexual harassment by another seminarian (“Seminarian 2”).¹ Monsignor Reilly confronted Seminarian 2 about the matter and removed him from ICS, concluding that his conduct (including conduct

¹ Seminarian 1 and Seminarian 2 were both adults enrolled in graduate degree programs at ICS.

unrelated to the harassment allegations) was not consistent with that of a candidate for the priesthood. Further, Monsignor Reilly promptly reported Seminarian 2's dismissal to all parties he understood needed to be apprised of the situation, including (i) Seminarian 2's sponsoring diocese, (ii) ICS's formation faculty, and (iii) RCAN. Consistent with standard practice, the Seton Hall University Registrar and other administrative offices were notified that Seminarian 2 had been de-enrolled, though they were not informed of the reasons for this action. Monsignor Reilly did not report this incident to the University's Title IX Coordinator, as required by Seton Hall's Policy Against Sexual Harassment in place at the time, because he was not aware that he was obligated to do so.

This 2012 ICS incident surfaced years later as the Latham investigation neared its conclusion in August 2019. At that time, Seminarian 2 came forward alleging for the first time, as relevant to this Review, that in fact he was the one who had been sexually harassed by Seminarian 1 in 2012 and that he had been denied due process in connection with Monsignor Reilly's prompt dismissal of him from ICS in 2012. Because these allegations were raised at the tail end of the Latham investigation, Seton Hall engaged Nukk-Freeman & Cerra, P.C. ("Nukk-Freeman") to conduct a separate investigation of this issue. In its findings issued in March 2020, Nukk-Freeman concluded that ICS did not follow Seton Hall's reporting and investigatory protocols with respect to this 2012 incident.

The 2014 SAH Matter

In 2014, a member of the SAH faculty was removed from his position following allegations of inappropriate conduct directed at another adult member of the seminary community. No students or minors were involved in this incident. This Report addresses the 2014 SAH matter briefly. The Latham Report does not identify any misconduct by Monsignor Reilly in connection

with this incident. The law firm Gibbons P.C. (“Gibbons”),² as Seton Hall’s outside counsel, interviewed Monsignor Reilly about this incident in January 2020, and Monsignor Reilly reported that he was not involved in the matter. In 2014, Monsignor Reilly was not serving in an SAH leadership role; rather, he was serving as Rector/Dean of ICS. After his interview in January 2020, Seton Hall no longer considered this 2014 SAH matter as grounds for any remedial action against Monsignor Reilly. This Review credits Monsignor Reilly’s statements that he had no involvement in or first-hand knowledge of the 2014 SAH matter. No documentary or testimonial evidence examined during this Review undermines this conclusion.

The Special Task Force Letters

This Report analyzes the Special Task Force process, including the two letters from the Special Task Force that appeared in media reports. Gibbons prepared these letters on behalf of the Special Task Force. This Review determined that these letters contain material inaccuracies, as discussed further below, and that the second letter was never sent to Monsignor Reilly.

The first Special Task Force letter, dated November 25, 2019, stated that the Latham Report found Monsignor Reilly was aware of sexual harassment allegations involving seminarians at ICS in 2012 and failed to report the allegations to University officials in violation of the University’s Title IX policies. The letter also stated that Monsignor Reilly declined to answer investigators’ questions regarding certain allegations of sexual harassment at SAH (in 2014). The letter further stated that Seton Hall’s Responsive Action Plan recommended that the Archbishop of Newark remove Monsignor Reilly from his position as Rector of ICS and that he also be removed from the University Board of Trustees and Board of Overseers. Finally, the letter offered Monsignor Reilly an opportunity to respond to these findings.

² Gibbons P.C. merged with Frost Brown Todd LLP in February 2026 to form FBT Gibbons.

The second letter, dated February 18, 2020, repeated the assertions about the 2012 ICS incident and then stated that, because Monsignor Reilly had submitted to an interview with Gibbons in January 2020, the prior finding concerning the 2014 SAH matter was “no longer applicable.” The February 2020 letter otherwise reiterated the recommendation that Monsignor Reilly be removed from seminary leadership and University boards.

This Review identified significant discrepancies between the Latham Report, the RAP, and the Special Task Force letters’ characterizations of those documents. In particular, this Report details that several of the representations in the Special Task Force letters were inaccurate or inconsistent with the underlying record. Moreover, this Review confirmed from multiple sources that the February 2020 letter was never finalized or sent to Monsignor Reilly.

First, the letters stated that the “Latham Report *found*” that Monsignor Reilly was aware of sexual harassment allegations at ICS and failed to report those allegations to the University. As discussed above, however, the Latham Report actually made no findings regarding Monsignor Reilly or the 2012 ICS incident. Because Seton Hall elected to investigate the relevant allegations separately, Latham expressly declined to address the 2012 ICS incident in its report. Indeed, the separate investigation into the 2012 ICS incident conducted by Nukk-Freeman was not completed until March 2020, months after both Special Task Force letters were prepared.

Second, the letters further inaccurately stated that the RAP recommended that Monsignor Reilly be removed as Rector of ICS and from University boards. In fact, the RAP did not recommend Monsignor Reilly’s unconditional removal. Rather, the RAP recommended that Monsignor Reilly remain in his role as Rector and on the relevant boards, provided the Rector/Dean position at ICS was split into two roles, with a layperson Dean installed alongside a

priest Rector. The letter further omits that, per the RAP, this proposed structural governance change was itself contingent on a review of canon law issues that remained unresolved.

This Review further identified why Seton Hall decided not to send the February 2020 draft letter to Monsignor Reilly. Contemporaneous communications reflect that members of the Special Task Force themselves raised concerns about the draft letter's proposed discipline. Specifically, they questioned whether the discipline was proportionate given all the circumstances. Among the concerns raised were whether Monsignor Reilly was aware of or had been trained on Seton Hall's reporting policies in place in 2012, and whether subsequent training had remediated the concerns raised.

Governance Amendments and the Resolution of the Monsignor Reilly Matter

Shortly thereafter, in March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic shut down University operations, the matter concerning Monsignor Reilly went dormant. Separately, University leaders were actively negotiating amendments to the Affiliation Agreement between the University, RCAN, and ICS. The governance amendment negotiations addressed, among other things, housing agreements and enhanced Title IX training and compliance requirements. The Board of Overseers endorsed, and the Board of Regents ultimately approved, these governance amendments in June 2020.

The convening of these Board meetings in June 2020 prompted University leadership to return to the open question of Monsignor Reilly's status. Specifically, in preparing invitation lists for the June meetings, the Board secretary raised the question of whether Monsignor Reilly should be invited, given that his status had not been formally resolved. After consulting with the University's President and General Counsel, the Chair of the Board of Regents spoke to a Special Task Force member, who confirmed on behalf of the Special Task Force that if Monsignor Reilly acknowledged his reporting obligations going forward, the matter would be resolved.

Accordingly, the Chair of the Board of Regents proposed that Monsignor Reilly confirm his understanding of these reporting obligations in a letter to Cardinal Joseph Tobin, C.Ss.R., D.D., as Chair of the Board of Trustees, President of the Board of Regents, and Monsignor Reilly's religious superior. Monsignor Reilly sent a letter to Cardinal Tobin on June 10, 2020, acknowledging that he understood his obligations and explained that he was unaware of those obligations at the time of the 2012 ICS incident. He further affirmed that recent University training had clarified his reporting requirements and that, moving forward, he understood the importance of timely reporting to the University. Cardinal Tobin shared Monsignor Reilly's letter with the Chair of the Board of Regents, who in turn forwarded it to the Special Task Force, University President, and General Counsel.

After receiving Monsignor Reilly's June 2020 letter, the University treated it as satisfying the RAP's recommendations as to Monsignor Reilly. The Chair of the Board of Regents confirmed in June 2020 that the matter was fully and finally resolved. No changes were made to Monsignor Reilly's leadership roles. He continued to serve both as Rector/Dean of ICS and on various University boards. In 2023, the University promoted Monsignor Reilly to Vice Provost for Academics and Catholic Identity, reflecting the University's continued confidence in his leadership.

This Review finds Monsignor Reilly's explanation that he had not been trained on the applicable policy before 2012 credible, and University records confirm he first completed such training in 2013, after the 2012 ICS incident. Monsignor Reilly acted promptly and substantively when the allegations were reported to him in 2012, though he did not follow Seton Hall's prescribed reporting protocols—an error that, as the contemporaneous record reflects, was unintentional given that he had not been trained on the applicable policy. Since that time,

University training records reflect that Monsignor Reilly has consistently completed all required training on sexual harassment and Title IX policies, and no further compliance concerns have arisen.

The Presidential Search Process

In 2024, Monsignor Reilly emerged as one of the leading candidates for President of Seton Hall. In connection with the search process, the Presidential Search Committee conducted standard vetting of all candidates, which, in Monsignor Reilly's case, included securing a letter of suitability from RCAN. In the days leading up to the Board of Regents' vote for president, the Chair of the Board of Regents confirmed with both Seton Hall leadership and RCAN that any outstanding issues with respect to Monsignor Reilly and the 2012 ICS incident had been resolved from both the University's and RCAN's perspective as of June 2020. The Search Committee and the Board of Regents did not, however, review the University's internal investigation records relating to Monsignor Reilly. Although some Search Committee and Board of Regents members had general awareness of the prior investigations, the prior investigations' findings regarding Monsignor Reilly were not collectively considered during the selection process. Throughout this Review, interviewees consistently expressed a high degree of confidence in Monsignor Reilly's leadership and integrity.

The remainder of this Report is organized as follows:

- **Section I** outlines the scope and process of this Review.
- **Section II** provides background on Seton Hall's governance structure, By-Laws, and the institutional relationship between Seton Hall, RCAN, and ICS. It then reviews Monsignor Reilly's career at Seton Hall and discusses the facts of the 2012 ICS incident and the 2014 SAH matter, followed by an overview of the University's investigations following the

McCarrick allegations. These include the Latham investigation, the development of a Responsive Action Plan, the creation of a Special Task Force, the separate investigation by Nukk-Freeman, and subsequent governance reforms.

- **Section III** analyzes how the prior investigations and their findings pertained to Monsignor Reilly, discusses the governance amendments and the resolution of the Monsignor Reilly matter in June 2020, and sets forth this Review's assessment of Monsignor Reilly's explanation and Seton Hall's response.
- **Section IV** outlines Monsignor Reilly's continued role at Seton Hall from 2020 through 2023 and examines the 2023-2024 presidential search process.

I. Scope of Review and Process

RCAN commissioned Ropes & Gray to conduct a third-party review of matters relating to Monsignor Reilly's handling of allegations of sexual misconduct. As noted above, central to this Review are the findings and recommendations of prior investigations commissioned by Seton Hall and the related institutional response, including the Latham investigation and Seton Hall's development of a Responsive Action Plan. RCAN authorized a full examination of all relevant facts and placed no restrictions or limitations on the content of this Report. Ropes & Gray requested and received cooperation from the Board of Regents and Seton Hall throughout this Review.

This Report is based on a review of hundreds of relevant documents and several dozen interviews with a broad cross-section of stakeholders. This included an examination of RCAN records, such as personnel files, email correspondence, letters of suitability, and other correspondence between RCAN and Seton Hall. We also requested a broad range of documents from Seton Hall. Consistent with applicable privilege considerations and the scope of this Review,

the University provided only limited, redacted portions of its records exclusively pertaining to Monsignor Reilly and this Review, though no information regarding Monsignor Reilly was withheld. These included (i) internal Seton Hall and ICS records, emails, and policy documents; (ii) documents from Seton Hall's Board of Regents, Board of Trustees, and Board of Overseers; (iii) communications between and among University administrators, Board members, RCAN personnel, and others relating to the matters under review; (iv) personnel files, compliance training records, and policy manuals; and (v) publicly available materials, such as media reports and reports issued by the Vatican.

As part of this Review, we received information from nearly forty individuals through interviews, written statements, and other submissions. Participants included (i) current and former Seton Hall administrators, faculty, and staff; (ii) current and former members of Seton Hall's Board of Regents, Board of Trustees, and Board of Overseers; (iii) members of the Presidential Search Committee; (iv) individuals involved in previous investigations; (v) RCAN personnel with knowledge of relevant matters; and (vi) clergy and other individuals who worked with Monsignor Reilly throughout his career. Not all individuals contacted were willing to participate.

II. Background

a. University Governance Structures, By-Laws, and Affiliation Agreement

Seton Hall is a Catholic, diocesan university founded in 1856 by the first Bishop of RCAN. Seton Hall's By-Laws govern its internal operations, while an Affiliation Agreement between Seton Hall, RCAN, and ICS defines how these entities relate to one another. Seton Hall's governance framework centers on two principal bodies: the Board of Trustees and the Board of Regents. The mission of the Board of Trustees is to ensure that Seton Hall maintains its identity as a Catholic institution, to elect members of the Board of Regents, to manage the institution's real property, and, when necessary, to amend the By-Laws and other corporate documents. The Board

of Regents oversees Seton Hall's operating budgets, grants all degrees, defines the functions of major academic divisions, and appoints and removes the President and other officers of the University.

The Most Reverend Archbishop of Newark serves as Chair of Seton Hall's Board of Trustees and President of Seton Hall's Board of Regents. Cardinal Tobin has served in that role since 2017. Several lay individuals served as Chair of the Board of Regents during the events discussed in this Review. The President of Seton Hall serves as Chief Executive Officer and is responsible for the institution's operations and strategic direction. Under the By-Laws, the President must be a Roman Catholic priest unless the Board of Trustees grants an exception.

ICS is a non-profit corporation affiliated with Seton Hall that operates in two capacities: (i) as the major seminary of RCAN—the institution responsible for the final stage of priestly formation before ordination—it oversees theological and spiritual training at the graduate level, and (ii) as Seton Hall's School of Theology, it admits both seminarians and lay students and offers graduate and undergraduate degree programs. ICS is headed by a Rector/Dean, a combined leadership position reflecting the institution's dual character as both RCAN's major seminary and Seton Hall's School of Theology. SAH is led by its own Rector, and SAH seminarians pursue their academic coursework at Seton Hall while receiving formation through SAH in coordination with ICS.

The Affiliation Agreement, first executed in 1982 and periodically renewed, governs ICS's dual role as RCAN's major seminary and Seton Hall's School of Theology. The Agreement addresses administration, faculty, academic programs, facilities, and finances, and it specifies the respective authority of the Archbishop, Seton Hall, and ICS leadership over seminary operations.

b. Historical Relationship Between Seton Hall and ICS

The relationship between Seton Hall and ICS evolved over time, shaped in part by the institutions' physical proximity and ICS's distinct mission of seminary formation. The first Bishop of Newark founded ICS in 1860, just four years after Seton Hall's founding. For the seminary's first several decades, ICS operated on the Seton Hall campus in South Orange, New Jersey. In 1927, ICS moved to a separate location in Bergen County, New Jersey, where it remained for nearly six decades.

In 1984, ICS returned to Seton Hall's campus, but the legacy institutional culture of separateness persisted, some effects of which endured into the period covered by this Review. Multiple witnesses described ICS's day-to-day operations as historically "siloed" from Seton Hall administration. In practice, ICS operated, in many respects, with substantial autonomy, reporting to seminary leadership and RCAN on matters concerning priestly formation, seminary discipline, and pastoral concerns, while academic matters were governed by Seton Hall's standard processes.

c. Monsignor Reilly's Background

Monsignor Reilly, an incardinated priest of RCAN since his ordination in 1991, has served in various pastoral and academic positions within the Seton Hall community. From April 1994 to June 1995, he served as priest secretary to then Archbishop McCarrick, assisting with scheduling, correspondence, and other routine administrative functions. In 1995, he joined the staff of Seton Hall Preparatory School as a faculty member and chaplain.³ He began working at the University in 2002 as Rector of SAH, a position he held for ten years. In June 2012, he became Rector/Dean of ICS, serving in that dual capacity until 2022. During his tenure as Rector/Dean of ICS, he also served as an ex-officio member of the University's Board of Trustees and Board of Overseers.

³ Seton Hall Preparatory School is a separate and distinct entity from Seton Hall University. The Preparatory School was separately incorporated in the mid-1980s and is not affiliated with the University.

Following a year-long sabbatical, he became Vice Provost for Academics and Catholic Identity at Seton Hall in June 2023.

d. The 2012 ICS Incident

The 2012 ICS incident that is a principal subject of the Special Task Force letters occurred just months after Monsignor Reilly assumed the role of Rector/Dean of ICS. In September 2012, Seminarian 1 reported to Monsignor Reilly and the Vice Rector of ICS that Seminarian 2 had made unwanted sexual advances toward him, including unwanted touching. Monsignor Reilly and the Vice Rector promptly confronted Seminarian 2 and interviewed him about the allegations.

Seminarian 2 had also been the subject of other conduct concerns unrelated to the harassment allegations, including alleged dishonesty about his whereabouts and failures to adhere to seminary standards of accountability. Considering the totality of Seminarian 2's conduct, Monsignor Reilly immediately dismissed him from ICS because, in Monsignor Reilly's estimation, his conduct was inconsistent with expectations of a candidate for priesthood. In short order, Monsignor Reilly then notified ICS's formation faculty, Seminarian 2's sponsoring diocese, and RCAN of the incident and his dismissal. As a matter of standard administrative procedure, Seminarian 2's dismissal from ICS triggered notifications to various Seton Hall University offices to address registration, housing, financial, and other related administrative matters. These notifications to University offices did not, however, indicate the reason for his de-enrollment from the University. Seminarian 2 later reenrolled with the University and completed his remaining degree requirements at ICS through non-residential independent study and did not return to classes on campus.

Seton Hall's Policy Against Sexual Harassment in effect in September 2012 required that incidents of this nature also be reported to the University's Title IX Coordinator. Monsignor Reilly did not make such a report. The circumstances of that omission—including what Monsignor Reilly

understood his obligations to be and the training the University had provided to him—are addressed in Section III(h) below.

e. The 2014 SAH Matter

A separate incident relevant to the Special Task Force letters occurred at SAH in 2014, when a faculty member was removed from his position after allegations that he had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward another adult in the seminary community. No students or minors were involved. Although Monsignor Reilly was Rector/Dean of ICS at the time, he did not hold a leadership role at SAH and has consistently maintained that he had no direct involvement in or first-hand knowledge of the matter. As discussed further in Section III(d), the 2014 SAH matter was initially referenced in the Special Task Force’s November 2019 letter to Monsignor Reilly, but following an interview with Gibbons in January 2020, Seton Hall determined that no further action regarding Monsignor Reilly was warranted in connection with this matter.

f. Seton Hall Investigations and Responsive Action Plan Implementation

The investigations discussed in this Report trace their origin to Theodore McCarrick. McCarrick served as Archbishop of Newark from 1986 to 2000. In 2018, allegations emerged that McCarrick had engaged in a pattern of sexual misconduct, including the abuse of adult male seminarians. In response, Seton Hall’s Board of Regents retained the law firm Gibbons, which in turn engaged Latham, to conduct a comprehensive investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct by McCarrick as they related to the University and its seminary communities. As the investigation progressed, its scope broadened beyond McCarrick to address allegations of misconduct by other clergy, the University’s handling of such allegations, and the effectiveness of Title IX compliance at ICS and SAH. The investigation lasted close to a year, from the fall of 2018 through September 2019, when Latham issued its formal report. During that period, Latham

interviewed current and former seminarians, faculty, priests, University administrators, and staff, and examined relevant policies, institutional practices, and documentary evidence.

In the spring of 2019, the Chair of the Board of Regents established a working group composed of certain members of the Executive Committee of the Board of Regents (“Working Group”). The Working Group was charged with developing a Responsive Action Plan (“RAP”) to address Latham’s anticipated findings and conclusions, which it did in consultation with Gibbons, meeting regularly throughout the spring of 2019 to receive updates and draft the plan.

In August 2019, Latham and Gibbons, together with University leadership, presented the investigation’s findings along with the high-level principles of the RAP to the full Board of Regents. According to Seton Hall’s public Seminary Review Update (published August 27, 2019), Latham found that McCarrick had used his position of power to sexually harass seminarians, and that while Seton Hall’s Title IX policies were consistent with applicable law, those policies were not always followed at ICS and SAH, “result[ing] in incidents of sexual harassment going unreported to the University.”

In consultation with Gibbons, the Working Group recommended specific personnel actions regarding individual clergy as well as proposed policy and governance changes aimed at preventing future misconduct. Following that presentation, the Board of Regents passed a resolution authorizing and directing the Executive Committee and the President to implement the RAP (“Resolution”). The Resolution also authorized the creation of a Special Task Force—composed of three Regents and assisted by Gibbons—to convey findings to implicated priests and afford them an opportunity to be heard before any corrective action was taken.⁴

⁴ Also in August 2019, shortly before the Board presentation, Seminarian 2 from the 2012 ICS incident came forward with a complaint. Seminarian 2’s complaint included several allegations, but as relevant to this Review, he alleged that he himself had been sexually harassed by Seminarian 1 and improperly dismissed from ICS in 2012. As noted above, because these allegations were raised as the Latham investigation was coming to a close, the University

Beginning in the fall of 2019, the Special Task Force carried out its mandate by issuing notices to implicated clergy, with input from the University's President and the Chair of the Board of Regents. In late November 2019, the Special Task Force sent the first round of notices, informing each individual of the findings attributed to the Latham investigation as they related to that person and, where applicable, the RAP's recommendations as to that individual. Recipients were invited to respond. A set of supplemental letters to implicated priests was prepared in February 2020.

During this same period, Seton Hall leadership pursued governance reforms to address the institutional deficiencies the investigations had brought to light. These reforms centered on amendments to the By-Laws and, as relevant here, the Affiliation Agreement. Among other things, the Affiliation Agreement amendments required all seminary faculty to receive Title IX training, established mandatory compliance tracking across all schools—including ICS and SAH—and provided for the appointment of a deputy Title IX coordinator at ICS. The final amendments were adopted in 2020 and brought ICS more fully within Seton Hall's compliance and administrative framework.

III. Analysis of Prior Investigations' Findings and Assessment of Monsignor Reilly's Response

a. The Latham Report's Findings Concerning Monsignor Reilly

The Latham Report contains no adverse factual findings regarding Monsignor Reilly, who was the Rector/Dean of ICS when the Latham Report was issued. It does not find or allege that Monsignor Reilly witnessed any misconduct by McCarrick or that any such misconduct by McCarrick was reported to him. Monsignor Reilly has never been personally accused of sexual

informed Latham that it would investigate this complaint separately, and Latham explicitly did not address the 2012 ICS incident in its report. The University later retained the law firm Nukk-Freeman to investigate. Nukk-Freeman completed its report in March 2020. *See* Section III(e) below.

misconduct, and the Latham Report does not suggest otherwise. The Latham Report also does not address the 2012 ICS allegations, which were separately investigated by Nukk-Freeman, or contain any information or allegation that Monsignor Reilly was aware of the 2014 SAH matter. The Latham Report's references to Monsignor Reilly are limited to acknowledging his position as Rector/Dean of ICS and his involvement, together with other University and Archdiocesan leaders, in initiatives to strengthen coordination and information-sharing among RCAN, ICS, and Seton Hall.

b. This Review's Findings Concerning Monsignor Reilly's Professional Interactions with McCarrick

This Review also examined Monsignor Reilly's prior professional interactions with McCarrick. Monsignor Reilly confirmed that he never witnessed any sexual misconduct by McCarrick and that no one reported any such misconduct by McCarrick to him. For context, McCarrick frequented a beach house in Sea Girt, New Jersey, with groups of seminarians during his time as the Archbishop of Newark. As has been publicly reported, Monsignor Reilly was aware of widespread rumors that McCarrick shared a bed with seminarians at the beach house. However, as reflected in the Vatican's 2020 report on the McCarrick matter, the Latham investigation determined that "the sharing of beds with seminarians had been known among seminary staff and administrators" and that "no action was taken to curb the practice at the time, in part because it was understood to be non-sexual and consensual."⁵ Monsignor Reilly reported that he visited the beach house on one occasion before he served as McCarrick's priest secretary and that he stayed in a downstairs bedroom. As discussed above, Monsignor Reilly was one of several priests who rotated through the role of priest secretary to McCarrick, an administrative position in which he

⁵ Secretariat of State of the Holy See, Report on the Holy See's Institutional Knowledge and Decision-Making Related to Former Cardinal Theodore Edgar McCarrick (1930-2017) (10 November 2020), at 446-47, https://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_rapporto-card-mccarrick_20201110_en.pdf.

managed scheduling, handled correspondence, and assisted with routine matters. In his interview for this Review, Monsignor Reilly described the position as limited in scope and purely secretarial, and stated that, outside his professional duties, he had very limited personal interactions with McCarrick. Other clergy who served in the same capacity corroborated this characterization, describing Monsignor Reilly as maintaining a professional distance from McCarrick. Monsignor Reilly acknowledged one encounter during his tenure as priest secretary in which, while delivering mail to McCarrick's room one evening, McCarrick opened the door dressed in a t-shirt and underwear.⁶ Monsignor Reilly described his reaction as one of surprise, but he did not interpret it as sexual in nature or indicative of misconduct. Monsignor Reilly reported that McCarrick did not say anything sexual in nature (or otherwise inappropriate) during the encounter. One witness recalled Monsignor Reilly informing him of this event after it happened, having interpreted Monsignor Reilly's communication as a warning. Monsignor Reilly did not specifically recall discussing the encounter with anyone at the time but acknowledged he may have because he found it unusual.

c. The Responsive Action Plan's Findings and Recommendations Concerning Monsignor Reilly

The Working Group developed the RAP in consultation with Gibbons after receiving the Latham Report's findings. With respect to Monsignor Reilly, the RAP addressed three issues that are particularly relevant to this Review. First, it noted his prior service as McCarrick's priest secretary and that, as discussed above, he had visited a beach house on one occasion, reportedly staying in a downstairs bedroom because he had heard rumors of bed sharing; the RAP did not assert that Monsignor Reilly witnessed any misconduct by McCarrick or that such misconduct was

⁶ As noted above, Monsignor Reilly served as priest secretary to McCarrick in 1994-1995, approximately seven years before Monsignor Reilly began working at the University.

reported to him. Second, the RAP indicated that in 2012, Monsignor Reilly had addressed a report of alleged sexual harassment at ICS without reporting the incident to University officials, as required by the Policy Against Sexual Harassment then in effect. Third, the RAP asserted that in 2014, while Monsignor Reilly was Rector/Dean of ICS, he received information about an alleged incident of sexual harassment at SAH that was not reported to Seton Hall at the time.

Based on these facts, the RAP recommended that Monsignor Reilly could remain on the University Board of Trustees and the Board of Overseers if the Rector/Dean role at ICS was split, and a layperson Dean was installed with Monsignor Reilly continuing to serve as Rector. Importantly, the RAP acknowledged that splitting the Rector/Dean role would require a review of associated canon law implications. As discussed above, however, the Latham Report included no findings involving Monsignor Reilly and expressly did not address the 2012 ICS allegations or contain any information about Monsignor Reilly's knowledge of the 2014 SAH matter. The RAP's description of these matters was therefore not supported by the Latham Report itself. This Review sought to understand how these conclusions came to be included in the RAP in connection with the Latham Report's findings. While certain Special Task Force and Working Group members participated in interviews, others declined, as did Gibbons, which played an important role in developing the RAP and implementing its recommendations. As a result, this Review was unable to determine why the RAP contained conclusions that were not supported by, and in some cases contradicted, the Latham Report's actual findings.

d. The Special Task Force Letters

Having identified the discrepancies between the Latham Report and the RAP, this Report now turns to the specific content of (and inaccuracies contained in) the two Special Task Force letters to Monsignor Reilly.

i. The November 2019 Letter

In pertinent part, the November 2019 letter stated that the Latham Report concluded Monsignor Reilly was “aware of sexual harassment allegations involving ICS seminarians and did not report such allegations to [Seton Hall] officials, in violation of the university’s Title IX policies.” It also stated that Latham investigators found that Monsignor Reilly had “declined to answer questions regarding certain sexual harassment at SAH.” It further represented that the RAP “recommend[ed] that the Archbishop of Newark remove [Monsignor Reilly] from [his] position as Rector of ICS” and that he “be removed from [his] position on the [Seton Hall Board of Trustees] and the Board of Overseers.”

Several of these representations were inaccurate or inconsistent with the contemporaneous underlying record. The Latham Report made no findings that Monsignor Reilly was aware of sexual harassment allegations or failed to report them; as discussed above, Latham expressly declined to address the 2012 ICS incident because Seton Hall was conducting a separate investigation. The RAP did *not* recommend Monsignor Reilly’s removal; rather, it provided that he could remain as Rector of ICS and serve on the relevant University boards, provided a layperson Dean was installed at ICS. The RAP also flagged potential canon law issues associated with splitting the Rector/Dean role—a consideration that, in November 2019, remained unresolved. Nevertheless, the letter called for Monsignor Reilly’s unconditional removal, materially deviating from the RAP’s actual recommendation.

ii. January 2020 Interview of Monsignor Reilly

The Special Task Force invited Monsignor Reilly to respond to the “findings” in the November 2019 letter. On January 21, 2020, Gibbons interviewed Monsignor Reilly concerning the 2014 matter at SAH referenced in the RAP. Because Monsignor Reilly had previously declined to answer questions about the 2014 SAH matter on the advice of counsel, the purpose of the

January 2020 interview was to afford him the opportunity to address that topic; neither the 2012 ICS incident nor McCarrick were discussed in this interview. During the interview, Monsignor Reilly reported that he did not have specific knowledge of the 2014 SAH matter. No documentary or testimonial evidence contradicts this assertion. After this point, there were no further discussions regarding Monsignor Reilly and the 2014 incident—or any other matter arising from the Latham investigation—with the sole exception of the 2012 ICS incident.

iii. The February 2020 Draft Letter

In mid-February 2020, Gibbons assisted the Special Task Force in preparing a second, draft letter to Monsignor Reilly, dated February 18, 2020. The draft acknowledged that Monsignor Reilly’s January 2020 interview had satisfied his obligations regarding the 2014 SAH matter. It nonetheless reasserted that the Latham Report found Monsignor Reilly was “aware of sexual harassment allegations involving ICS seminarians in or about summer and fall 2012 and did not report such allegations to [Seton Hall] officials, in violation of the University’s Title IX policies,” and reiterated that the RAP recommended his dismissal as Rector of ICS and removal from the Board of Trustees and Board of Overseers. Like the November 2019 letter, the February 2020 draft letter did not address or condition outcomes on any split of the Rector/Dean role.

These representations were, again, inaccurate. The Latham Report contained no such findings, and the RAP did not recommend unconditional removal. No witness who participated in this Review, however, was able to account for these discrepancies, and outside counsel for Seton Hall at the time, Gibbons, declined to participate in this Review.

Based on the documentary record and witness recollections, this February 2020 draft letter—the same letter published in a February 2025 online news report—was never sent to Monsignor Reilly. Members of the Special Task Force themselves raised questions at the time about the draft letter’s proposed discipline, including whether Monsignor Reilly had received

training on the applicable policies at the time of the 2012 ICS incident and whether there was any indication that he had failed to follow proper procedures in the years since. In that context, the Special Task Force set aside the February 2020 letter.

During this same period, Seton Hall leadership began to address the broader institutional deficiencies that the investigations had brought to light, pursuing amendments to the Affiliation Agreement and addressing canon law considerations implicated by seminary leadership structures.

e. Nukk-Freeman's Findings

After the Latham investigation had concluded, the University retained Nukk-Freeman to investigate Seminarian 2's allegations, raised in August 2019, that he had been sexually harassed by Seminarian 1 and improperly dismissed from ICS in 2012. The University's Title IX office participated in the investigation, which concluded with a report issued in mid-March 2020. Nukk-Freeman concluded that ICS did not follow Seton Hall's reporting and investigatory protocols in responding to Seminarian 1's 2012 complaint—including that Monsignor Reilly did not notify Seton Hall's Title IX Coordinator and that Seminarian 2 was not afforded a support person when confronted with the allegation against him, both of which were required by the policy in effect at the time.⁷

Nukk-Freeman further concluded that Monsignor Reilly was on notice of the applicable policies because, in 2008, the Policy Against Sexual Harassment and related materials had been attached to an email sent to him in connection with an unrelated investigation involving SAH and ICS students. (We discuss the circumstances of this finding in further detail in Section III(h) below.) Monsignor Reilly was not accused of any wrongdoing in connection with that 2008 matter; he had been contacted in his capacity as an administrator and potential witness.

⁷ With respect to Seminarian 2's allegations of sexual harassment against Seminarian 1, Nukk-Freeman concluded that these allegations were not substantiated by the available evidence.

f. Amendments to the Affiliation Agreement

In the spring of 2020, the Board of Trustees, the Board of Regents, and RCAN negotiated amendments to various governance documents, most notably the Affiliation Agreement. The negotiations addressed institutional priorities including, among other things, housing arrangements for clergy and others on campus, reporting requirements between the seminaries and the University, and Title IX compliance. Seton Hall's initial proposals also included structural changes to seminary governance, including uncoupling the Rector/Dean position at ICS.

Certain structural proposals raised canon law concerns. Cardinal Tobin supported revisions aimed at ensuring the safety and security of students and strengthening reporting and compliance protocols, but identified aspects of the proposed governance changes that, from RCAN's perspective, could not be reconciled with canonical requirements. The parties worked through these issues with the assistance of a canon law advisor, ultimately identifying ways to achieve the underlying goals of transparency and compliance without structural changes that would conflict with canon law.

The final amendments, among other things, required all seminary faculty to receive Title IX training, strengthened University-wide reporting and investigative protocols, and addressed housing arrangements for clergy and others on campus. The proposed split of the Rector/Dean role was not adopted due to canon law constraints, but Seton Hall leadership determined that the amendments as adopted satisfied the RAP's objectives through other policy and compliance enhancements.

g. Resolution of the Reilly Matter (June 2020)

As the Board of Trustees and Board of Overseers prepared to convene in early June 2020 to approve the final amendments, the Board of Regents' secretary raised with Seton Hall's General Counsel the question of whether Monsignor Reilly should be invited, given that his status on

University Boards had not been formally resolved. The General Counsel raised the issue with the Chair of the Board of Regents and the President. The Chair of the Board of Regents consulted with a Special Task Force member who confirmed on behalf of the Special Task Force that a written acknowledgment from Monsignor Reilly of his reporting obligations going forward would resolve the matter. The Chair of the Board of Regents communicated this to Cardinal Tobin, who in turn conveyed the request to Monsignor Reilly.

Monsignor Reilly responded in a June 10, 2020, letter to Cardinal Tobin. In the letter, he explained that he had dismissed Seminarian 2 in 2012 because, in his estimation, Seminarian 2 had exhibited behavior inconsistent with that expected of a seminarian. He further explained that he had not reported the incident to Seton Hall in 2012 because he did not understand at the time that such a report was necessary. He affirmed that training received since 2012 had clarified his reporting requirements going forward. The letter was circulated to Seton Hall leadership. The documentary record reflects that Seton Hall leadership treated Monsignor Reilly's June 2020 letter as satisfying the RAP's recommendations with respect to Monsignor Reilly. The Chair of the Board of Regents confirmed via email on June 10, 2020, that the letter constituted a complete and final resolution of the matter. Recipients of this notice included a Special Task Force member, Seton Hall's President, Seton Hall's General Counsel, and Cardinal Tobin. Consistent with that understanding, no changes were made to Monsignor Reilly's leadership roles, and the matter was closed.

h. This Review's Assessment of Monsignor Reilly's Explanation and Seton Hall's Response

Monsignor Reilly's explanation that he was not aware of Seton Hall's specific reporting requirements at the time of the 2012 ICS incident is credible and supported by the documentary record. This Review conducted further investigation into the Nukk-Freeman investigation's

conclusion regarding Monsignor Reilly's constructive awareness of the applicable policies, including interviewing personnel from the University's Office of EEO and Title IX Compliance who were involved in the Nukk-Freeman investigation, and reviewing contemporaneous documentary evidence. That investigation revealed important context. The 2008 email to Monsignor Reilly, which included the Policy Against Sexual Harassment as an attachment, did not include any accompanying guidance on the policies or training on how the policies applied in practice. Monsignor Reilly acknowledged receiving the email but did not remember reading the attachments, much less recalling them four years later at the time of the 2012 incident. The documentary record contains no indication that he reviewed the attachments or was provided information or instruction on how to obtain training on the materials. Significantly, Monsignor Reilly was not trained on the University's reporting requirements prior to the 2012 ICS incident. Seton Hall's records show that Monsignor Reilly first completed such training in 2013.

ICS, while part of Seton Hall, operates as a distinct institution with a unique mission: the formation of candidates for the Catholic priesthood. It is governed in significant part by ecclesiastical standards and canonical requirements. Nevertheless, ICS remains subject to Seton Hall's institutional policies, including its reporting obligations, and ICS's ecclesiastical character did not exempt Monsignor Reilly from those obligations. In responding to the 2012 allegations, Monsignor Reilly addressed the situation through the lens of his role as Rector—treating the matter as a question of fitness for priestly formation rather than assessing whether the conduct triggered University reporting obligations.

Monsignor Reilly's conduct does not reveal any effort to conceal the 2012 ICS incident. He acted promptly upon learning of the allegations: he and the Vice Rector confronted and interviewed Seminarian 2, informed ICS's formation faculty, reported the matter to RCAN and the

seminarian's sponsoring diocese, and dismissed the seminarian from ICS. Moreover, the dismissal itself generated administrative communications with University offices responsible for enrollment, housing, and student finances, though the underlying reason was not disclosed. While Monsignor Reilly did not comply with applicable University reporting requirements, the record supports the conclusion that this was an unintentional error rather than a deliberate failure to act.

IV. Monsignor Reilly's Continued Role at Seton Hall and the 2023-2024 Presidential Search

a. Monsignor Reilly's Continued Role at Seton Hall (Summer 2020 to Summer 2023)

Following the June 2020 resolution of the matters arising from the prior investigations, Monsignor Reilly continued to serve as Rector/Dean of ICS and as a member of the University Board of Trustees and Board of Overseers. In 2022, Seton Hall's President and Provost approved the creation of a new University position, Vice Provost for Academics and Catholic Identity, and selected Monsignor Reilly for the role. In a public announcement, University leadership at the time commended Monsignor Reilly's two decades of service in priestly formation, highlighting his leadership of ICS and development of the formation faculty.

Before assuming the new role, Monsignor Reilly took a year-long sabbatical. Seminary leaders who have served extended tenures—particularly those who have completed the customary ten-year term—routinely take sabbaticals before transitioning to new roles. Monsignor Reilly had served ten years as Rector of SAH followed by ten years as Rector/Dean of ICS without a sabbatical. Multiple witnesses and the documentary record confirm that his sabbatical was in accord with standard practice and was not connected to or prompted by the prior investigations or their findings. Upon completing his sabbatical, he assumed the Vice Provost role, serving for approximately one year before becoming President in July 2024. Throughout this period,

Monsignor Reilly remained in good standing with Seton Hall and RCAN. Interviewees from the faculty, priest community, and administration consistently described him as well-respected and highly regarded across campus. Many colleagues viewed him as a stabilizing and mission-driven leader, and his appointment as Vice Provost was seen as a vote of confidence in his integrity and abilities.

b. Initiation of the Presidential Search and Composition of the Search Committee

Following the departure of Seton Hall's President in July 2023, the Chair of the Board of Regents initiated the search process for Seton Hall's next president. In accordance with the By-Laws and longstanding governance practices, the Board of Regents oversaw the process, with significant involvement from the Board of Trustees. The Presidential Search Committee ("Search Committee") was formed in the manner prescribed by the By-Laws, with representatives from the Board of Trustees, Board of Regents, the priest community, and Seton Hall administration and faculty. The Chair of the Board of Regents played a central role in coordinating the process and was Chair of the Search Committee. He served as the primary liaison among the Search Committee, Cardinal Tobin (in his capacity as Chair of the Board of Trustees), and the search firm that the Search Committee engaged to assist with the process.

The Search Committee's composition and procedures were designed to ensure a broad and representative vetting of candidates, with a particular focus on clergy in "good standing." In the initial stages of the Search Committee's work, the Committee consulted with the Cardinal and University leadership regarding the scope of the candidate pool. Consistent with the University's By-Laws and Catholic mission, the search focused on Roman Catholic priests.

c. Candidate Vetting and Due Diligence

The Search Committee, with assistance from the search firm, conducted a review of potential candidates. This review included, among other things, background checks, reference

checks, and obtaining letters of suitability from ecclesiastical authorities. As set forth in the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, first promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in June 2002 and commonly known as the “Dallas Charter,” a letter of suitability is a formal written attestation issued by a cleric’s diocesan bishop, eparch, or religious superior certifying that the cleric is of good moral character, is not limited or disqualified from ministry, and is suitable to work with minor children. This requirement serves as a safeguard to ensure that clergy exercising ministry outside their diocese of incardination have been affirmatively vetted by their proper ordinary prior to undertaking any ministerial assignment. In Monsignor Reilly’s case, the Search Committee solicited a letter of suitability from RCAN. The Vicar General of RCAN issued the letter in January 2024, confirming (i) that Monsignor Reilly is a “person of good moral character and reputation,” (ii) that he knew “nothing which would in any way limit or disqualify [Monsignor Reilly] from this ministry,” and (iii) that he was “unaware of anything in [Monsignor Reilly’s] background which would render [Monsignor Reilly] unsuitable to work with minor children.”

The search firm also conducted standard background and reference checks on all candidates, including Monsignor Reilly. Its review did not identify any concerns regarding his candidacy. In interviews, some Search Committee members described relying on the assurances provided through these standard due diligence channels, with a general understanding that any significant concerns would be brought to the Search Committee’s attention. The standard due diligence conducted during the search process did not surface the discussions contained in the prior Seton Hall investigations concerning Monsignor Reilly.

d. Awareness of Prior Investigations

Several members of the Search Committee—including certain Board of Regents and Board of Trustees members—had some general awareness of the Latham investigation and its connection

to Monsignor Reilly. Among those individuals, some understood the matters to have been fully resolved, while others had residual concerns. Cardinal Tobin, as Chair of the Board of Trustees and President of the Board of Regents, was aware of the prior investigations and the 2012 ICS incident, but understood the matter to have been fully and finally resolved in June 2020, as reflected in contemporaneous communications he had received at the time. A subset of Search Committee members, however, were unaware that Monsignor Reilly had been referenced in connection with the prior University investigations discussed in this Report.

No Search Committee members recalled any discussion of the Latham Report or any related investigations during the Committee's consideration of Monsignor Reilly. The Search Committee never collectively evaluated whether Seton Hall's prior investigations into Monsignor Reilly had been adequately resolved, nor did the Committee assess the underlying findings or conclusions of those investigations. Moreover, neither Cardinal Tobin nor any members of the Search Committee interviewed for this Report—including the Chair of the Board of Regents—recalled being briefed on the Nukk-Freeman investigation. Because the Nukk-Freeman findings were unknown to the Search Committee, they were not considered at any point in the vetting process.

e. Deliberations and Decision-Making

Throughout the search process, the Search Committee engaged in discussions regarding the qualifications and suitability of candidates. While some members raised questions about Monsignor Reilly's tenure as McCarrick's priest secretary and alluded to the Latham investigation, these concerns were the subject of little to no substantive discussion during the deliberations. In

fact, several Search Committee members did not recall any such questions being raised at any point in the process.

All Search Committee members who participated in interviews reported that Monsignor Reilly was viewed positively among the candidates, with many citing his longstanding commitment to Seton Hall, his pastoral leadership, and his ability to unify the community. Some members expressed a preference for a lay candidate with more extensive executive experience, but the majority ultimately agreed to consider only clergy candidates, consistent with the By-Laws' requirement that the President be a Roman Catholic priest absent an exception granted by the Board of Trustees. In the final stages of its work, the Search Committee narrowed the pool of candidates to five and conducted in-person interviews with each. Following these interviews, the Search Committee deliberated and narrowed the pool to three finalists, at which point the Search Committee's work was complete.

f. Final Selection and Appointment

In late March 2024, the Chair of the Board of Regents, together with various Seton Hall administrators, coordinated stakeholder meetings with the finalists. At these meetings, various Seton Hall constituencies had the opportunity to interview finalists and offer written feedback. Participants included the priest community, students, faculty, and the Board of Regents. After the meetings, participants offered written feedback via a Presidential Finalist Feedback Survey. According to multiple witness accounts, there was no discussion of the Latham investigation or any related issues concerning Monsignor Reilly during the finalist sessions. However, one survey respondent anonymously submitted feedback expressing concern about Monsignor Reilly's candidacy because of his connection to McCarrick and the Latham investigation. The survey results, including this feedback, were provided only to the Chair of the Board of Regents; they were not shared broadly with the Search Committee or the full Board of Regents. Around the

same time, at least one individual separately raised concerns with the Chair of the Board of Regents about whether Monsignor Reilly was suitable in light of the Latham investigation.

Subsequently, in the days leading up to the Board of Regents' final vote, the Chair of the Board of Regents sought confirmation from Seton Hall leadership that there were no outstanding issues bearing on Monsignor Reilly's candidacy. Based on a review of the relevant correspondence—including the June 2020 communication from the Chair of the Board of Regents at the time indicating that the matters concerning Monsignor Reilly had been resolved—Seton Hall leadership confirmed to the Chair of the Board of Regents that the matters concerning Monsignor Reilly had been resolved as of June 2020. Separately, in early March 2024, the Interim President of Seton Hall emailed Cardinal Tobin attaching a copy of Monsignor Reilly's June 10, 2020, letter and noting that the letter confirmed that any issues related to Monsignor Reilly stemming from the 2012 ICS incident had been satisfactorily closed.

The Chair of the Board of Regents sought further confirmation from the Vicar General of RCAN in March 2024 that RCAN was not aware of any disqualifying information regarding Monsignor Reilly stemming from the Latham investigation. The Vicar General reaffirmed, consistent with his January 2024 letter of suitability, that he was not aware of any disqualifying information.

g. The Board of Regents Vote

At the end of March 2024, the Board of Regents convened to consider the Search Committee's recommendations, deliberate on the finalists, and cast their vote for Seton Hall's next President. During final deliberations, some participants recall that questions were raised about whether there were any outstanding issues with Monsignor Reilly that would render him unfit to be President. The Chair of the Board of Regents conveyed the aforementioned assurances he had received from both Seton Hall leadership and RCAN, and the Board of Regents relied upon these

confirmations to proceed to a vote. There was no discussion of the prior investigations' findings during the deliberations. The Board of Regents subsequently voted and elected Monsignor Reilly the twenty-second President of Seton Hall, effective July 1, 2024.

CONCLUSION

In sum, this Review found that the Latham Report contained no adverse findings regarding Monsignor Reilly and that the Special Task Force letters inaccurately characterized both the Latham Report's findings and the RAP's recommendations. With respect to the 2012 ICS incident, Monsignor Reilly took prompt action, as noted above. However, he failed to report the 2012 ICS incident to the University, which was not in accordance with the then-applicable policy. This was an unintentional error attributable in significant part to his lack of training on Seton Hall's reporting requirements before 2013. In June 2020, the University determined that the 2012 ICS incident was resolved in light of Monsignor Reilly's written explanation and concurrent governance reforms. During the 2023-2024 presidential search, the Search Committee conducted standard due diligence, and before the final vote, the Chair of the Board of Regents confirmed with both University leadership and RCAN that any outstanding issues concerning Monsignor Reilly and the 2012 ICS incident had been resolved as of June 2020. The Search Committee and the Board of Regents did not collectively consider Seton Hall's internal investigative records during the presidential search process.

We appreciate the cooperation of RCAN, Seton Hall, and the many individuals who participated in this Review—those who sat for interviews as well as those who provided documents, correspondence, and other materials. Any determination regarding further action based on these findings is beyond the scope of this Review.