Department of Justice Announces Changes to Corporate Enforcement Policies; More Carrots and Sticks

On May 12, 2025, at SIFMA’s annual Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division Chief announced a new White-Collar Enforcement Plan and accompanying changes to three white-collar and corporate enforcement policies. Key policy revisions include: 1) additional incentives for corporate cooperation; 2) updated criteria for imposing compliance monitorships; and 3) an expansion of whistleblower priorities.

I. White-Collar Enforcement Plan

a. Corporate Enforcement Priorities

The Department has announced priorities that align with the Administration’s already articulated “America First” objectives. The Department released an accompanying memorandum, titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime,” listing what the Criminal Division considers to be 10 focus, “high-impact areas.” These include waste, fraud, and abuse, including health care fraud; federal program and procurement fraud; trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion; conduct that threatens national security, including material support to foreign terrorist organizations (“FTOs”), which includes certain cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations (“TCOs”); and fraud that victimizes U.S. investors, individuals, and markets.

The list also includes “bribery and associated money laundering that impacts U.S. national interests, undermines U.S. national security, harms the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and enriches foreign corrupt officials.” This is notable considering the Executive Order issued on February 10, 2025, which temporarily paused the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).

b. Focus on Expeditious Criminal Resolutions

The Department continues prioritizing individual prosecutions, consistent with the Department’s historical focus on individual accountability. The Department instructs prosecutors to consider factors when deciding whether to charge a company, including self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation. Corporate resolutions for companies that cooperate and remediate “should not be longer than three years except in exceedingly rare cases.”

In efforts to encourage “efficiency,” the Department has directed prosecutors to move expeditiously to investigate cases and make charging decisions, indicating it will track investigations by the Criminal Division to ensure matters are “swiftly concluded.” There is no stated timeframe for what might be considered “expeditious” or “swift,” but this emphasis suggests a push toward shorter-term investigations. For companies, that may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it may help keep cases from lingering needlessly. On the other, compressing the timeframe for an investigation may significantly tax corporate resources and may invite prosecutors to make charging decisions on an expedited basis without a fulsome record.

II. Updated Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”)

The Department has revised the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”) to clarify when companies can expect a declination and to outline the benefits a company can expect to receive if it self-discloses, cooperates, and remediates. The revised CEP also leaves the safety valve open in cases with aggravating factors, affording prosecutors discretion in pursuing the appropriate resolution.

Under the updated CEP, there are three paths to corporate criminal matter resolution. Under the first path, if a company voluntarily self-discloses¹ misconduct, fully cooperates with the Criminal Division’s investigation, timely and appropriately remediates, and presents no aggravating circumstances, the company will receive a declination, rather than merely the presumption of one as in the previous iteration of the policy. While voluntary self-disclosure typically requires companies to disclose misconduct that is not previously known to the Criminal Division, the revisions preserve an August 2024 amendment to the CEP that extends a declination to companies that disclose misconduct to the Department before the Department reaches out to the company and within 120 days of receiving an internal report from a whistleblower who also submitted a report to the Department. This eliminates ambiguity around what may qualify a company for a declination that may help companies more accurately weigh whether or not to disclose misconduct to the Department.

The second path, the “near miss” path, affords certain favorable resolution terms if a company fully cooperates and timely and appropriately remediates but is ineligible for a declination because (1) its report of misconduct did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure or (2) because the company had aggravating factors that warrant a criminal resolution. In near miss cases, the Criminal Division “shall” still i) provide a Non-Prosecution Agreement, ii) allow a term length of fewer than three years, iii) not require an independent compliance monitor, and iv) provide a reduction of 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) fine range. While the Department previously considered some of these factors in reaching corporate resolutions absent voluntary disclosure, this change delineates more clearly the substantial benefits available to companies who in good faith self-disclose after, unbeknownst to them, the Department has already become aware of the misconduct.

Under the third path, when a company is ineligible for resolution under the above options, prosecutors have discretion to recommend the appropriate resolution including form, term length, compliance obligations, and monetary penalty. Regarding monetary penalty, companies will not receive a reduction of more than 50% off the fine under the U.S.S.G. Notably, unlike the prior version of the CEP, for companies that fully cooperate and timely and appropriately remediate, there will be a presumption that the reduction will be taken from the low end of the U.S.S.G range. This policy change incentivizes companies to appropriately remediate corporate misconduct and cooperate with the Department, but still leaves it up to the prosecutor to determine whether a heavier penalty is appropriate.

The revised policy introduces a nuanced framework for assessing cases in which aggravating circumstances exist; in sum, a declination is not necessarily off the table. If there are aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor may decide to recommend a declination in any case based on the totality of the aggravating circumstances, cooperation, and remediation. A declination in this circumstance is subject to prosecutorial discretion and not guaranteed, however.

III. Changes to Monitorship Practices

The Department has also revised its corporate monitorship policy to clarify the factors that prosecutors must consider when imposing a monitor so that it is appropriately tailored to “address specific issues and concerns that created the need for the monitor while minimizing expense, burden, and interference with the business.”

The announced changes signal that there may be fewer monitorships imposed by the Department during this Administration, and more leeway will be afforded companies to enhance their compliance programs. According to the Department’s memorandum, prosecutors in the Criminal Division must weigh a list of factors when determining to impose a monitor. Notable new factors include a consideration of whether the imposition of a monitor would reduce the risk of recurrence of criminal conduct that “significantly impacts U.S. interests.” This language reflects the Department’s focus on “America First” policies. Additionally, the revised memorandum instructs the Criminal Division to consider whether a company is subject to oversight by U.S. or international regulators, which could weigh against the imposition of a monitor.

Notably, for the first time, the memorandum introduces guidance on costs, including a cap on hourly rates charged by monitors and a requirement for monitors to provide cost estimates subject to Department approval. The Department thus has greater oversight on costs to ensure they are proportionate with the underlying criminal conduct, the company’s profits, and the company’s size and risk profile. It remains to be seen whether the Department’s greater oversight will affect the monitorship’s independence. The Department also announced it would impose fewer corporate compliance monitors going forward and that it is reviewing preexisting monitorships to narrow their scope or terminate them.

IV. Expansion of Whistleblower Priorities

The Department also released an updated overview of the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program which notably builds upon its prior iteration. The program is a three-year pilot program designed to incentivize individuals to report criminal misconduct by offering awards for original, truthful information about crimes in one or more of the designated areas. 

The original subject areas included financial crimes, such as money laundering and financial fraud, crimes of foreign corruption and bribery, such as violations of the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act and the FCPA, domestic bribery, and certain health care fraud offenses. The Department has added the following priority areas to the program: procurement and federal program fraud; trade, tariff, and customs violations; violations of federal immigration law; and violations involving sanctions, material support of foreign terrorist organizations, or those that facilitate cartels and TCOs, including money laundering, narcotics, and Controlled Substances Act violations. The revised Program also expands the scope of health care fraud that will qualify, now including health care offenses and related crimes involving both private and public health care benefit programs. Notably, no subject area listed in the 2024 iteration of the policy was taken off of the list. A redline reflecting the changes between the 2024 and 2025 policies is available here.

Consistent with the first iteration of the program, to qualify for a financial award, tips must result in a forfeiture action. But, the policy shift aims to channel whistleblower engagement toward conduct that poses the greatest risk to national and economic security. 

Key Takeaways 

“America First” Enforcement Priorities. The Department's revised policy sharpens its focus on “America First” enforcement, targeting waste, fraud, abuse, national security, trade, sanctions, cartels, and TCOs. Key priorities include combating bribery and money laundering that threaten U.S. interests and security, despite a temporary pause on FCPA enforcement previously announced.

Investigation Timing and Criminal Resolutions. Prosecutors are now directed to expedite investigations and charging decisions. The Criminal Division will closely monitor cases to prevent delays, potentially accelerating the pace of investigations. However, this push is not without risk and may result in premature charging decisions without the benefit of a comprehensive review.

Incentivizing Corporate Self-Reporting. The updated Corporate Enforcement Policy encourages voluntary self-disclosures by being less "stingy" with the carrot, guaranteeing declinations for fully cooperative companies that implement remedial measures, barring aggravating circumstances. Prosecutors retain discretion in high-impact cases, where companies might still face the stick.

Mitigating “Race to the DOJ” Reporting. New policies reduce somewhat the rush for companies to self-report. Now, companies that disclose misconduct within 120 days of an internal whistleblower report, and before the Department contacts the company, will receive a declination. This is even if the Department is already aware of the misconduct. Substantial benefits like Non-Prosecution Agreements and fine reductions are possible for timely, good-faith disclosures. However, given the environment of DOJ hiring freezes and still-unclear level of overall focus on corporate criminal enforcement, companies will need to analyze carefully whether or when to self disclose an issue to the government.

Expanding Whistleblower Priorities. The continuation and expansion of the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program indicate a sustained commitment to pursuing credible leads from whistleblowers. The program now covers additional misconduct categories, including federal procurement fraud, trade tariff fraud, and national security-related offenses. The Department remains dedicated to rewarding whistleblowers who provide credible leads on these critical enforcement areas. Whistleblowers remain a key risk area for companies regarding Department scrutiny, and in light of these changes, companies should calibrate their compliance programs to account for heightened areas of whistleblower risk.