Applying DOJ’s Heightened Fraud Focus to Medical Product Safety and Quality: Key Takeaways from Recent DOJ and HHS Policy Statements

Article
November 18, 2026
14 minutes

Over the past year, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have significantly reshaped how health care fraud cases are identified, investigated, and resolved. In October 2026 alone, the agencies announced six initiatives addressing corporate enforcement priorities, charging approaches, exclusion authority, self-disclosure, and whistleblower rewards.

Although the government has resolved few corporate enforcement matters involving medical product safety and quality issues based on alleged violations of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements so far this year, this quieter period may be short-lived. Recent DOJ policies highlight combating health care fraud, including the distribution of unsafe or poor-quality medical products, as a key enforcement priority. This focus may prompt prosecutors to scrutinize core FDA regulatory and quality matters through a fraud-focused lens. Depending on the facts and the prosecution team’s approach, DOJ may pursue these matters under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), criminal conspiracy or fraud statutes, the Federal False Claims Act (FCA), or a combination of these authorities.

This Article examines recent developments at DOJ, including those involving its new National Fraud Enforcement Division (NFED), and at HHS, and considers their implications for FDA-regulated medical product manufacturers, whose quality and regulatory compliance functions are likely to remain under the microscope for the foreseeable future.

Department of Justice Reorganization and Reprioritization

Creation of NFED and Centralization of Criminal Fraud Units

Following President Trump’s March 16, 2026 issuance of Executive Order 14395, “Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud,” then-Acting Attorney General (AG) Todd Blanche issued a memorandum on April 7, 2026, formally establishing NFED (see our prior Alert here). The memorandum called for a “comprehensive and coordinated approach” to combating fraud and directed Colin McDonald, NFED’s first Assistant Attorney General (AAG), to assume immediate operational control of three Criminal Division components, including the Health Care Fraud Unit,1 and to establish and direct the allocation of resources within the Criminal Division. It also required DOJ’s Office of Legal Policy to recommend within 30 days which criminal prosecutorial resources should be realigned into NFED, applying a presumption that units or sections with similar missions would be included. In the memorandum, AG Blanche emphasized NFED’s reliance on local U.S. attorneys’ offices, required a recommendation within four months on whether to incorporate non-criminal DOJ components into the division, and instructed the Civil Division to designate an NFED liaison to ensure DOJ leverages the “full range of enforcement tools” to combat fraud.

On August 13, 2026, as described in a prior Alert, AAG McDonald issued a memorandum which identified health care fraud as one of NFED’s top enforcement priorities, promising “cutting-edge data analysis” and increased scrutiny of “companies and individuals that deceptively market unsafe products and services.” Notably, AAG McDonald did not direct the transfer of the Civil Division’s Civil Frauds Unit, which enforces the FCA, into NFED.

Directive 26-12, titled “Corporate Enforcement in the Fight Against Fraud” and issued by AAG McDonald on October 1, 2026, further positioned NFED as the key driver of DOJ’s criminal health care fraud enforcement efforts and, again, expressly included FDCA violations among its corporate enforcement priorities (see our prior Alert). Directive 26-13, issued one week later, instructed NFED prosecutors to consider tax, securities, and consumer fraud charges alongside traditional fraud charges. It also highlighted the overlap between fraud against the government and fraud on investors, particularly in matters involving companies that benefit from federal agency approvals, such as FDA authorizations.

These DOJ memoranda and directives intensify the pressure on NFED prosecutors to search for evidence that can be construed as fraud and pursue fraud-focused enforcement against health care and life sciences companies. NFED’s launch of the Whistleblower Incentive Program (WHIP) on October 20, 2026, may further accelerate target identification and case development by offering awards for actionable tips, payable upon the public filing of charges rather than at resolution.

Continued Impact of 2025 DOJ Reorganizations and Workforce Reductions

The significant restructuring of DOJ’s fraud operations follows the late 2025 dissolution of the Civil Division’s Consumer Protection Branch (CPB), which historically had primary authority within DOJ to supervise and coordinate civil and criminal FDCA enforcement and also represented FDA in defensive matters. In our 2025 Year End FDA Enforcement Review, we noted that the loss of CPB as a centralized FDCA enforcement hub, together with the widely reported exodus of FDA and DOJ attorneys and investigators with specialized FDCA expertise and institutional knowledge, and the staffing of a number of remaining experienced FDCA prosecutors on cases involving the provision of gender-affirming care, could affect the consistency, pacing, and selection of enforcement theories in more traditional FDCA matters. The recent reassignment of other seasoned DOJ prosecutors to units with new leadership and broad mandates, combined with mounting pressure to bring and resolve cases quickly, may further affect which cases are prioritized in the short term and how they are resolved.

Complex enforcement matters requiring a deep understanding of the FDA regulatory framework, and a thorough analysis of highly technical product design and quality records and regulatory submissions, typically take longer to develop than more straightforward billing fraud cases, where outlier billing can often be easily identified through data analytics.2 The Philips Respironics matter, which arose from FDA-requested recalls of sleep and respiratory devices beginning in June 2021, illustrates this point. A criminal subpoena was publicly announced in April 2022, and an FDCA consent decree was entered in April 2024, but it was not until November 3, 2026, that Philips disclosed that an agreement in principle had been reached to resolve the related criminal and civil investigations. The resolution is not expected to be completed until Q1 2027.

The developments described above also raise questions about which part of DOJ will be pursuing FDCA enforcement matters. Many CPB prosecutors with criminal FDCA enforcement experience were transferred to the Criminal Division’s Health and Safety Unit (HSU), and the Civil Division’s Enforcement and Affirmative Litigation Branch (EALB) absorbed much of CPB’s civil FDCA work. The HSU and EALB both currently reside outside of NFED. Given NFED’s repeated prioritization of FDCA enforcement in the context of product safety issues, it is unclear what criteria will be used to determine when a criminal FDCA case will be pursued by NFED as opposed to HSU, and what role, if any, NFED will play in civil FDCA enforcement.

Potential Impact of Fraud Focus and Executive Order 14294 on Settlement Structure

Although there are few criminal FDCA settlements involving corporations and executives to look to as examples so far this year, DOJ’s increased focus on fraud and President Trump’s Executive Order 14294, “Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations,” may influence how future resolutions are structured.

Issued on May 9, 2025, Executive Order 14294 states that strict liability offenses are “generally disfavored” and directs criminal regulatory prosecutions toward matters involving alleged knowledge of unlawful conduct. It also emphasizes that criminal prosecution should be a last resort, encouraging civil and administrative enforcement where feasible. Although Executive Order 14294 does not amend the FDCA, its policy direction may discourage misdemeanor pleas under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1), which have long featured in corporate resolutions with drug and device manufacturers.3

Greater reliance on FDCA charges based on intent to defraud or mislead under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2), or on other criminal fraud theories, raises significant concerns regarding the possibility of exclusion from participation in federal healthcare programs. Convictions for qualifying offenses, like Medicare or Medicaid fraud, and felony convictions related to fraud in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service (which often includes FDCA violations) can trigger mandatory exclusion, potentially threatening the viability of companies supplying essential medical products.4 Misdemeanor FDCA convictions raise the prospect of permissive exclusion,5 although FDCA corporate misdemeanor resolutions have often avoided entity exclusion from federal healthcare programs through a corporate integrity agreement (CIA) as part of a parallel civil resolution under the FCA. A CIA is an agreement between an entity and the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) that outlines obligations to improve compliance and prevent fraud.

The tension between the drive to stamp out fraud and the risk that enforcement against life sciences companies could limit the availability of critical medical products paid for through federal and state healthcare programs may lead to greater use of corporate deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to resolve alleged felony violations, alongside felony pleas by individual executives. The March 2026 resolution of the ExThera Medical Corporation enforcement matter illustrates this approach. ExThera entered into a three-year DPA resolving a felony FDCA charge involving the failure to file adverse event reports with intent to defraud or mislead FDA, while its former Chief Regulatory Officer pleaded guilty to a felony FDCA charge.6 This resolution preserved individual accountability while allowing ExThera to avoid the potentially disruptive consequences of a qualifying corporate conviction resulting in mandatory exclusion.

A DPA or NPA does not eliminate exclusion risk. HHS-OIG may impose permissive exclusion without a criminal conviction for conduct involving false or fraudulent claims, unlawful kickbacks, or unnecessary or substandard services. Accordingly, facts admitted in a settlement agreement could still provide a basis for permissive exclusion, depending on the nature of the conduct and its connection to federal healthcare programs. Admissions of fraud can also damage a company’s reputation and public confidence in its products.

DPAs and NPAs also come with significant compliance commitments. CPB’s Corporate Compliance and Policy Unit played a significant role in standardizing and “templatizing” compliance provisions in DPAs and NPAs. It remains to be seen whether and how compliance commitments in such agreements will change in the aftermath of DOJ’s restructuring and the increasing role that NFED may play in FDCA cases in the future.

Civil Enforcement Carries a Large Load

The FCA remains an oft-used enforcement mechanism for alleged FDA regulatory violations affecting product safety and quality. In 2025, seven corporate resolutions were resolved solely through FCA settlements without parallel FDCA criminal resolutions.7 The Civil Division’s Fraud Section, within the Commercial Litigation Branch, continues to pursue these cases, and its experienced leadership remains largely unchanged. By contrast, EALB brought only a handful of injunction actions in 2026, generally against smaller firms.8

Delegation of Permissive Exclusion Authority to CMS

Alongside these shifts, HHS has expanded the authority of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to address health care fraud. On October 14, 2026, HHS published a Federal Register Notice formally delegating permissive exclusion authority under Section 1128(b) of the Social Security Act to CMS. Historically, HHS-OIG exercised both mandatory and permissive exclusion authority. CMS now shares permissive exclusion authority with HHS-OIG, but mandatory exclusion authority remains exclusively with HHS-OIG.

In the Notice, HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. writes that CMS’s responsibility for administering Medicare and Medicaid makes it “uniquely positioned to investigate, identify, and develop the evidentiary basis underpinning permissive exclusion determinations.” This delegation may affect which agencies participate in resolving health care fraud matters. HHS-OIG has historically played a central role in resolution discussions, assessing whether to exercise its exclusion authority based on investigative findings and admissions made at resolution. HHS has clarified that CMS will not participate in FCA settlements and that HHS-OIG will continue to resolve permissive exclusion issues on HHS’s behalf in FCA matters and voluntary submissions under its self-disclosure program.9

In other matters, however, potentially including cases brought by NFED or HSU, parties may need to address exclusion risk with both HHS components. It remains unclear when CMS will participate in resolution discussions or whether a resolution with HHS-OIG will also address CMS’s exclusion authority. HHS-OIG has stated that it does “not have additional information to share regarding case allocation.”10

New and Updated Voluntary Disclosure Programs

DOJ and HHS have also recently introduced more structured, coordinated voluntary disclosure pathways. Because these programs offer different benefits and impose distinct requirements, companies must assess whether potential exposure is criminal, civil, or both, and identify the relevant enforcement authority and disclosure pathway. Government data analytics and whistleblower incentives may also narrow the window for disclosure before authorities learn of conduct independently.

Voluntary Disclosure of Potential Criminal Violations

DOJ’s department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”), last updated on March 10, 2026, provides, among other incentives, a presumption of declination for companies that voluntarily self-disclose, fully cooperate, and timely and appropriately remediate, absent aggravating circumstances.11 A CEP declination requires payment of applicable disgorgement or forfeiture and restitution, and is made public. On October 15, 2026, NFED and HHS-OIG issued the Policy on Coordination of Voluntary Self-Disclosure in Health Care Fraud Matters (the “Coordination Policy”), allowing companies to obtain benefits under both the CEP and HHS-OIG’s Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol (“SDP”) through a single qualifying disclosure to NFED. Good-faith disclosures to other DOJ criminal components, including HSU, remain protected under the CEP and Coordination Policy and will not result in the loss of any applicable benefits of disclosure.

A qualifying CEP disclosure must concern misconduct not previously known to the DOJ criminal component, and disclosure must not be required by a preexisting obligation. These requirements warrant particular attention for life sciences companies, which may be required to report issues to FDA or other regulatory authorities. Reporting only to regulators or HHS-OIG generally does not qualify for CEP voluntary disclosure credit, although good-faith disclosures may support cooperation and remediation credit. Regulatory transparency is also an important defense to later allegations of fraud on the regulator.

Voluntary Disclosure of Potential Civil Violations

The Healthcare FCA Self-Disclosure Pilot Program (“FCA Pilot”), launched on October 22, 2026, offers favorable settlement terms and coordinated administrative relief for eligible disclosures.12 Eligible companies may resolve FCA liability by paying 1.25 to 1.6 times a base amount, without factual admissions, HHS-OIG exclusion or Corporate Integrity Agreement (“CIA”), CMS revocation of enrollment and billing privileges, or civil monetary penalties from either agency. In kickback-based matters, the kickback’s value can serve as the base amount.

The FCA Pilot covers only conduct “previously unknown to the federal government,” a broader knowledge standard than the CEP’s focus on what is known to DOJ. How the pilot will treat conduct already observed or documented by FDA through a Form 483, warning letter, or recall remains unclear. The government has confirmed, however, that a company making a qualifying voluntary disclosure of criminal matters to NFED under the CEP need not make a duplicate FCA Pilot disclosure.13

Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Self-Disclosure

Determining whether to voluntarily disclose potential violations of law requires thoughtful consideration and a weighing of the very attractive potential benefits that accompany disclosure against critically important risks, often on a compressed timeline. A disclosure may prompt a broader investigation than anticipated or trigger referrals between agencies, and any CEP declination resulting from the disclosure will be public. Whistleblowers may also drive timing. The CEP preserves a 120-day window in which a company that receives an internal whistleblower report may still qualify for a declination even if the whistleblower reports to DOJ first, but that exception is tied to the Criminal Division’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, and DOJ has not yet addressed whether it applies to a tip submitted only through WHIP. Moreover, even a successful voluntary disclosure under the CEP or SDP that protects the disclosing company is not likely to protect its personnel. Disclosure and cooperation typically require a company to identify responsible individuals and provide evidence of their misconduct.

The early record of NFED enforcement counsels caution. NFED has brought more than 1,000 cases against individuals since its inception, but only three corporate cases, only one of which involved self-disclosure. Based on the data, it is unclear whether companies are pursuing voluntary disclosure.

The requirements for obtaining the maximum benefit from disclosure are complex, and in a political environment focused on stamping out fraud, any disclosure must be carefully framed, sequenced, and supported. There is no one-size-fits-all approach: the decision whether, when, and to whom to disclose depends on the specific facts and potential exposure and should be made in close consultation with experienced counsel.

Looking Ahead

The enforcement landscape is likely to continue to evolve in the coming months. DOJ may provide more clarity on criminal oversight of FDA-regulated companies, including regarding what criteria will result in investigation and prosecution by NFED as opposed to HSU. It will also be important to monitor what DOJ learns from WHIP and the FCA Pilot, and whether more permanent changes follow.

In the meantime, companies should assume whistleblowers remain watchful. Companies should take reported product safety and quality concerns seriously, investigate them thoroughly in accordance with relevant procedures, and clearly document findings and actions taken in response, as appropriate. Accurate and transparent quality records and communications with FDA, payors, and customers are essential. Robust communication and information sharing between quality and compliance teams are equally important, both for forward-looking risk mitigation and in the context of resolving DOJ matters where the compliance organization may be tasked with explaining to the government how existing or new quality system controls are sufficiently robust to prevent the conduct that is the focus of the enforcement matter.14 Further, a DOJ agreement may require the compliance function to evaluate and report to DOJ potential quality and regulatory violations, necessitating a good understanding of the company’s state of compliance with such obligations.

Ropes & Gray will continue to monitor enforcement developments that impact life sciences companies. If you have any questions about the implications of recent DOJ and HHS developments for drug, biologic, and device manufacturers, or would like to discuss questions around voluntary disclosure, please contact any member of our FDA regulatory or litigation and enforcement practices, or your usual Ropes & Gray advisor.

  1. Pursuant to AG Blanche’s memorandum, AAG McDonald also assumed operational control of two other Criminal Division components: the Tax Section and the Market, Government, and Consumer Fraud Unit.
  2. DOJ increasingly has direct access to sophisticated data analytics, including through the Health Care Fraud Data Fusion Center, announced in 2025 to support collaboration among HHS-OIG, FBI, and the Data Analytics Team within the Criminal Division’s Health Care Fraud Unit. Since its creation, NFED has used data analytics to detect and investigate suspicious billing and payment patterns through its National Fraud Detection Center and an interagency agreement facilitating its access to CMS’s Integrated Data Repository. On the civil side, the Civil Division launched its Fraud Oversight through Careful Use of Statistics (FOCUS) Initiative in April 2026, working with “data miner” relators to analyze public government data for signs of fraud.
  3. The FDCA’s strict liability misdemeanor provision, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1), allows prosecution without proof of intent. Under the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine (also known as the “Park doctrine” based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1975 ruling in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)), corporate executives may be held criminally liable for misdemeanor violations of the Act based solely on their position of authority and responsibility to prevent or correct violations of the Act. Liability can be imposed even without evidence of personal intent, knowledge, or negligence.
  4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).
  5. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b), permissive exclusion may arise on various grounds, including certain misdemeanor convictions relating to fraud in connection with the delivery of a healthcare item or service, obstruction of an investigation or audit, as well as, even without a conviction, conduct involving false or fraudulent claims to a federal health care program, unlawful kickbacks, or unnecessary or substandard services.
  6. See U.S. v. ExThera Medical Corp., No. 1:26-cr-10056 (D. Mass. 2026); U.S. v. Sanja Ilic, No. 1:26-cr-10055 (D. Mass. 2026).
  7. For a more in-depth review of these 2025 enforcement matters, see Joshua Oyster, Beth Weinman, and Pascale Stain, FDA Enforcement Review: Looking Back at 2025 and Bracing for Continued Unpredictability in 2026, Ropes & Gray (Jan. 27, 2026).
  8. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Files Complaint to Stop Nevada Firm from Manufacturing and Selling Adulterated and Misbranded Dental Products (Aug. 6, 2026); Press Release, FDA, Federal Court Enters Consent Decree Against Gold Star Distribution, Inc. Following Persistent Insanitary Warehouse Conditions (Sept. 2026).
  9. See HHS-OIG, Exclusions FAQs (last updated Nov. 6, 2026).
  10. Id.
  11. Aggravating circumstances may concern the seriousness of the offense or the nature of the offender. Where declination is unavailable, the CEP’s “near miss” track offers an NPA with reduced penalties and no independent compliance monitor, absent particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances. See Geoffrey M. Atkins, Sarah Coyne, James P. Dowden, Laura G. Hoey, Sarah E. Walters, Natalia Mercado Violand, DOJ’s Fraud Division Corporate Enforcement Directive: What Changes in Practice, Ropes & Gray (Oct. 5, 2026).
  12. Submissions are due by April 22, 2027, must be complete and certified, and cannot be withdrawn. Companies ineligible for the FCA Pilot may still receive credit under Justice Manual § 4-4.112.
  13. See Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department’s Civil Division and the Department of Health & Human Services Announce Anti-Fraud Healthcare Self-Disclosure Pilot Program (Oct. 22, 2026).
  14. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. v. ExThera Medical Corp., No. 1:26-cr-10056 (D. Mass. 2026) (requiring ExThera to, among other obligations, implement a compliance program to prevent violations of FDA adverse event reporting requirements and report to DOJ regarding remediation and implementation of these compliance measures).