Supreme Court to Resolve Circuit Split on Title IX Employment Discrimination Claims

Summary

On May 18, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, agreeing to decide whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides employees of federally funded educational institutions a private right of action to sue for sex discrimination in the employment context. The case presents a question that has divided the federal circuits for decades: whether Title IX’s protections extend beyond students to cover college coaches, professors, and other school employees. The Court’s decision could have significant implications for higher education institutions, their employees, and the broader landscape of employment discrimination law, as well as the college sports landscape.

Background on Title IX

Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Enacted in 1972 as part of the Education Amendments, the statute’s only express enforcement mechanism is an administrative procedure resulting in the withdrawal of federal funding from noncompliant institutions. The statute does not expressly provide a private cause of action. However, in the 1979 decision Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action under Title IX in connection with a student alleging sex discrimination in the medical school admission process.

Subsequently, in its 1982 decision in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, the Court held that Title IX’s broad prohibition on sex discrimination against any “person” encompasses employment discrimination, and upheld federal regulations covering employment practices at funded institutions. Notably, however, North Haven addressed the federal government’s authority to enforce Title IX through administrative regulations, not the scope of the implied private right of action.

Later, in its 2005 decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court held that Title IX’s implied private right of action encompasses claims of retaliation by an employee who complained about sex discrimination against students. There, a coach of a girls’ basketball team was terminated after complaining about unequal funding for the girls’ team. Critically, Jackson involved an employee plaintiff—the coach of the basketball team—whose claim was based on retaliation for reporting discrimination against students, not on sex discrimination relating to his own employment.

Unresolved, though, was the threshold question: whether Title IX’s implied right of action extends to employees alleging sex discrimination in their own employment.

Title VII vs. Title IX: Key Practical Differences

The practical significance of this circuit split lies in the meaningful differences between Title VII and Title IX and the enforcement framework of the two statutes. Title VII—the federal statute expressly prohibiting employment discrimination—requires plaintiffs to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 (or, in certain circumstances, 300) days before bringing suit, and caps compensatory and punitive damages based on employer size at amounts ranging from $50,000 to $300,000 (although back pay and front pay awards and the recovery of attorneys’ fees remain uncapped under Title VII). Title VII also generally does not impose personal liability on individual supervisors or decision-makers. Title IX, by contrast, requires no administrative exhaustion, borrows the applicable state personal-injury statute of limitations (typically two to three years), and provides uncapped compensatory damages—though punitive damages are unavailable under Spending Clause legislation. Title IX may also expose individual decision-makers to personal liability in certain circumstances. If employees may sue under both statutes, they could circumvent Title VII’s procedural and damages limitations, subjecting institutions and their officials to broader liability.

These differences are further complicated by state anti-discrimination laws, which vary widely in their filing deadlines, damages provisions (including the availability of uncapped or punitive damages), individual liability frameworks, and administrative prerequisites. A ruling recognizing Title IX employment claims would add another layer to the already complex patchwork of federal and state obligations that institutions must navigate.

The Cases Below

In the lead-up to Crowther, Thomas Crowther, a former art professor at Augusta University, and MaChelle Joseph, the former head women’s basketball coach at Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), sued their respective institutions for violations of Title IX. The two cases reached opposite results on the same legal question before being consolidated on appeal.

Crowther. Augusta University suspended Crowther after finding that he had violated the university’s sexual harassment policy and ultimately declined to renew his contract. Crowther filed suit alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title IX. The district court denied the motion to dismiss his Title IX claims, concluding that Title VII does not preclude Title IX employment discrimination claims.

Joseph. Georgia Tech fired Joseph in 2019 after finding she had engaged in misconduct, including creating an abusive environment for her players. She alleged that the firing was retaliation for her persistent complaints about the university’s disparate treatment of women's sports. The district court dismissed Joseph’s Title IX employment discrimination claims as precluded by Title VII.

The Eleventh Circuit Decision. In November 2024, the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and held that Title IX does not provide an implied private right of action for employment discrimination. The court emphasized that Title IX is Spending Clause legislation whose express enforcement mechanism is the withdrawal of federal funding, not private litigation. It further reasoned that Congress’s intent to protect employees was “less obvious” than for students, especially given that Title VII had been extended to educational institutions just three months before Title IX’s enactment, and that courts cannot expand an implied right of action absent clear congressional intent.

The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc in April 2025 over a lengthy dissent that argued that the panel decision “contradicts a long line of Supreme Court precedent.”

The Circuit Split

The federal circuits are deeply divided on the question presented. Petitioners characterize the split as 8-3 in favor of allowing a private right of action for employees under Title IX. Respondents sharply contest the breadth of that claimed divide.

All parties agree that three circuits—the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits—have held that employees may not bring Title IX claims for employment discrimination. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have reasoned that Title VII’s comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes a parallel implied remedy; the Eleventh Circuit held more broadly that Title IX does not create such a right of action at all.

The parties disagree, though, about how many circuits have affirmatively recognized a Title IX private right of action for employment discrimination. Petitioners identify eight circuits that do so—the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Respondents argue, however, that of those eight, only the Third Circuit’s 2017 case Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center has actually held that Title IX provides a private right of action where Title VII governs—and even that decision, respondents contend, expressly limited its reasoning to private-sector employers.

The Government’s Position

At the Supreme Court’s invitation, the U.S. Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in April 2026 recommending that the Court grant certiorari. The government agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s bottom-line conclusion that Title IX does not provide a private right of action for employment discrimination, reasoning that “Congress’s subsequent enactment of Title IX cannot be read as impliedly circumventing the express requirements of Title VII’s enforcement scheme.” Notably, this position represents a reversal by the government. In 1995, the Solicitor General argued that Title IX does provide a private right of action for employment discrimination, but the government acknowledged it has since “reconsidered that view” following “developments in this Court's jurisprudence, percolation in the courts of appeals, and multiple changes in Administration.”

As to the circuit split, the government posited a narrower divide than petitioners, contending that four of petitioners’ eight circuits—the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—had not squarely ruled on the question. Nonetheless, the government concluded that the remaining conflict was “entrenched” and had “deepened over the 30 years since the United States first recommended that the Court grant certiorari.” Thus, despite agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit on the merits, the government urged the Court to take the case to resolve the conflict and provide nationwide clarity.

Practical Significance and Potential Implications

The Court's eventual ruling will have substantial practical consequences for federally funded educational institutions and their employees.

• Interaction with Title VII: As discussed above, if the Court holds that employees may sue under Title VII and Title IX plaintiffs could bypass Title VII’s administrative prerequisites and damages limitations, giving claimants a faster and potentially more lucrative path to relief with expanding institutional liability.
• Implications for employees: If the Court rules that Title IX provides a private right of action in the employment context, employees at federally funded schools, colleges, and universities would gain access to a significant alternative avenue for pursuing sex discrimination claims. Over 1,000 Title IX complaints were filed with the Department of Education (DOE)’s Office for Civil Rights by employees at higher education institutions between 2011 and 2022, underscoring the breadth of potential claims at stake.
• Implications for institutions: Colleges, universities, and other federally funded educational institutions currently face different rules depending on the circuit in which they operate. A definitive ruling will provide nationwide clarity, but could also expand institutional exposure to litigation if the Court recognizes Title IX employee claims. Institutions should be aware that Title IX compliance obligations already extend to employment practices under DOE regulations, but a ruling recognizing a private right of action would enable individual employees—rather than only the federal government—to enforce those obligations directly through litigation.
• Effect on current Title IX regulatory landscape: The Court’s ruling will land during a period of regulatory change. In 2020, the Trump administration’s DOE promulgated the first binding Title IX regulations governing how educational institutions must respond to sexual harassment, establishing requirements including, among other things, a narrow harassment definition, and mandatory live hearings with cross-examination in the college and university setting. The Biden administration issued a 2024 Final Rule that sought to significantly overhaul that framework in a number of ways, including by expanding protected bases to include gender identity and sexual orientation and broadening the harassment standard. However, a federal court vacated the Biden Final Rule in January 2025, and DOE did not appeal the vacatur. As a result, DOE has returned to enforcing the 2020 regulations. A ruling on the scope of the implied private right of action will thus determine the scope of Title IX liability amid pronounced regulatory whiplash. A recognition of a private right of action for employment-based Title IX claims would compound that uncertainty by adding an avenue of litigation exposure for institutions that are already navigating an unprecedented wave of legal challenges in the athletic context, including disputes over student-athlete eligibility, NIL rights, and antitrust liability. Even if the Court declines to recognize such a right, the decision would not eliminate institutions’ obligations to prevent employment sex-based discrimination, which remains independently grounded in Title VII, applicable state anti-discrimination laws, institutional policies, and contractual commitments.

Looking Ahead

The case is docketed for the October Term 2026 and a decision will likely be issued by mid-2027.

Given the current Court’s well-documented skepticism toward expanding implied rights of action, and the Solicitor General’s recommendation to side with the Eleventh Circuit — reversing the government’s own prior position based on intervening doctrinal developments — many observers expect the Court may limit or foreclose the implied private right of action for employees under Title IX. However, a narrower resolution remains possible: a distinction between standalone employment discrimination claims, where Title VII already provides a comprehensive remedy, and claims like those in the Court’s 2005 decision in Jackson that arise from an employee’s advocacy on behalf of students, preserving some employee access to Title IX while addressing the Title VII preclusion concern.

In the interim, the law remains fractured, with the determination of whether employees of federally funded educational institutions may pursue Title IX employment discrimination claims dependent on where they are located.