Background
On 23 October 2026, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published the findings of its multi-firm review of conflicts of interest in private markets.
The FCA findings are the culmination of a review that began in October 2025 into how UK private market firms identify, manage and mitigate conflicts of interest in private markets. The scope of the review covered fund management, discretionary portfolio management and investment advisory services across private equity, private credit and real estate asset classes.
The review follows the FCA’s February 2025 “Dear CEO” letter to asset managers and its Private Market Valuation Review (PMVR), published in March 2025, which found that many firms had not fully identified or documented valuation-related conflicts. For further background, please see our prior insights on the FCA Letter to Asset Managers and the PMVR Findings.
Similar to the PMVR, the review had two phases. Phase 1 involved a questionnaire sent to a broad sample of private market firms. Phase 2 involved on-site visits to a smaller select group of firms where the FCA tested how these firms identified, monitored and managed conflict risks in practice.
The findings do not set out a defined set of expectations on firms but rather provide commentary on examples of good and bad practices. The FCA recognises that there is no ‘one size fits all approach’ to managing conflicts, and more complex business models demand appropriate governance, control and escalation frameworks.
Whilst many firms demonstrated effective governance and a clear focus on investor outcomes, the FCA note that standards varied considerably amongst the firms surveyed. In some cases the FCA observed that governance arrangements and controls had not evolved in line with the growing complexity of firms’ business models, ownership structures, product offerings and activities (and therefore inherent conflict risks).
What You Should Do
The FCA expects firms to consider its findings and identify any gaps in their approach to identifying, assessing and managing conflicts of interest.
Key Findings
The FCA observed a number of different points in its findings which we summarise below.
Cross-fund transfers and continuation vehicles. Conflicts in the use of continuation vehicles and transfers between funds, such as where an asset is transferred from an older fund to a new vehicle, will be familiar to many firms. The FCA identified that examples of weak conflicts arrangements relied on investor disclosure or investor consent, without substantive independent challenge. Reliance on the same independent valuation or governing committee for both sides of the transaction was also seen as weak practices.
The FCA noted that strong standards included clear separation of responsibilities, robust valuation practices and documented evidence showing how the firm had considered different investor interests throughout the transaction.
Gifts and entertainment. The FCA dedicated a significant amount of commentary in the review to gifts and entertainment and how they can create actual or potential conflicts, as well as an inducement, if not appropriately controlled.
The FCA sees hospitality that is frequent and of a high value are particular risk areas, as well as where provided by organisations seeking commercial relationships with the FCA firm. Firms are expected to be able to explain the rationale for gifts and entertainment, in particular air travel and high value sporting events. Firms are also expected to take account of repeated hospitality with the same provider, recipient, or business relationship.
Examples of strong arrangements include clear frameworks with detailed record keeping, defined escalation steps and active compliance oversight. Documenting the value of the gift or entertainment, business purpose, basis for valuation, relevant conflict and inducement considerations and rationale for approach were noted as strong practices. Firms where records demonstrate the exercise of judgement by compliance committees, such as documenting where hospitality was not accepted, was also noted as good practice.
By contrast, the FCA highlighted that weaker frameworks often maintained records that were incomplete or lacked sufficient context. The basis of valuation was not clear, business justifications were frequently generic, and approvals were not always supported by clear reasoning.
The FCA reminds firms that it expects them to be able to demonstrate that controls relating to gifts and entertainment frameworks operate effectively in practice, and are not just confined to policies and procedures.
Information barriers. Weak information controls can give rise to multi-fund investment conflicts or the misuse of non-public information in breach of market abuse rules. The FCA considers weaker arrangements relied on training, informal zoning and limited monitoring, a particular concern for firms operating across the capital structure.
Stronger arrangements on the other hand had active compliance involvement in monitoring and applied clear restrictions around information sharing. The FCA gave the example of best practice being a firm with clear physical, organizational and system-based separation, that included zoning teams into separate areas, as well as giving staff digital permissions to separate asset classes or strategies.
Substance and scale of activities should determine conflicts frameworks. Where UK entities are characterised as advisory only, with investment decisions taken offshore, the FCA observed UK conflicts frameworks that were too narrowly scoped, despite UK staff being involved in significant parts of the investment lifecycle. Frameworks should instead reflect the substance of UK activities.
- International groups. For UK firms forming part of an international group, better frameworks operated conflicts governance at both UK and group level, so that conflicts material to the UK business were reviewed by UK-based senior management.
Use of LPACs. The FCA cautioned that LPACs are not always an effective conflict management tool and that firms should not rely on consulting a subset of investors as the primary mechanism for managing material conflicts. This should instead appear alongside strong oversight and conflicts-management arrangements.
Allocation, investor alignment and side letters should have prescriptive governance arrangements. The FCA expects documented allocation frameworks with predefined criteria and a recorded rationale, demonstrated alignment of GP and investor interests, and assessment of the cumulative impact of MFNs and side letters on other investors.
Disclosure is not a substitute for conflict management. Stronger firms treated disclosure as a supplementary control and made timely, event-driven disclosures early enough to influence outcomes, rather than relying on quarterly reporting cycles or fund documentation. The FCA also encourages firms to consider whether conflicts can be reduced or avoided through the design of their business models, structures and processes.
Complex business models demand proportionately stronger controls. The FCA found a clear link between the complexity of a firm’s business model and its inherent conflict risk, but firms with the greatest inherent risk were not always the most effective at managing it. Firms that grew across asset classes, strategies, fund structures or group affiliations did not always evolve their frameworks accordingly.
Identification of conflicts throughout the investment lifecycle. Stronger firms embedded responsibility for identifying and escalating conflicts across all three lines of defence, supported by training and clear escalation routes. They screened for conflicts from the earliest stage of the transaction, and set triggers for reassessment throughout the lifecycle. Weaker firms relied on a single line of defence or on individuals to spot and escalate conflicts, and some identified only generic private markets conflicts rather than those specific to their own business.
Documentation must be tailored and current. Some conflicts frameworks appeared to exist primarily to meet a regulatory expectation and were misaligned with underlying policies. Group policies repurposed for private markets businesses were not always sufficiently tailored, and generic computer-based training was viewed as weaker practice.
Second line defence independence. Compliance teams were sometimes closely involved in running conflicts processes on live deals, much like an investment bank’s control room. Stronger firms recognised that this could limit the compliance function’s ability to review those decisions independently after the event, and kept “control room” staff separate from those providing second-line assurance.
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